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Gert Rosenthal* 
(a) The concept of economic integration 
Although so much has been written 
on the subject of integration, interpreta-
tions of what it implies are far from 
uniform. For instance, the idea has 
differed in different countries and has 
even changed within the same country 
from one period of time to another. For 
some authors, an economic integration 
process consists in the total abolition of 
customs barriers between different nation-
al economic units (the partial elimina-
tion of such barriers would be only 
economic ' co-operation ' ) • ' For others, 
the abolition of inter-country barriers 
should be accompanied by the elimina-
tion of every type of obstacle to the 
mobility of factors - including social 
mobi l i ty - 2 at the national level. Yet 
others concentrate on the institutional 
aspects and consider that integration 
"means the process of transferring exclu-
sive expectations of benefits from the 
nation-state to some larger enti ty".3 
Lastly, economic integration is envisaged 
as involving the unification of several 
economies in a single whole, with total 
mobility of factors within this expanded 
^ee Bela Balassa, "Towards a Theory of Eco-
nomic Integration",Kyklos, N° 1, 1961,pp. 1-5; 
and The Theory of Economic Integration, Home-
wood, Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961, pp. 1-2. 
2
 See Gunnar Myrdal, An International Eco-
nomy, New York, Harper, 1957, p. 11. 
3See Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, 
"Economic and Differential Patterns of Political 
Integration: Projection about Unity in Latin 
America", International Political Communities: 
An Anthology, New York, Anchor Books, 1966, 
p. 265. 
The report of the tenth session of the 
Central American Economic Co-operation 
Committee maintains that the integration 
process admits, and today requires, a mul-
tiplicity of approaches in which past 
achievements and the basic and perma-
nent orientations that are deep-rooted in 
the best integrationist tradition are appro-
priately combined with innovative action. 
In the present article an attempt is made 
to clarify the possible scope and signifi-
cance of this assertion. 
An essay on this subject is a some-
what hazardous undertaking, for numer-
ous have been the studies published in 
recent years on various questions relating 
to the economic integration of Central 
America, comparatively little has been 
written on the conceptual frame of refe-
rence which has guided this process in the 
past and might continue to do so in the 
future. 
The article begins with a brief sum-
mary of the most outstanding aspects of 
integration theory -both in the economic 
field and in that of political science—, and 
goes on to recall the history of the 
Central American economic integration 
process up to the present time. Lastly, 
general guidelines are suggested for an 
approach that might help to resolve the 
many problems by which this process is 
confronted today. 
*G. Rosenthal is the Director and I. Cohen 
a staff member of the Mexico Office of CEPAL. 
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economy, and total unification of poli-
cies under the direction of centralized 
institutions.4 
In some instances the impulse to 
integration may derive from important 
political causes, as was the case, for 
example, with the European Economic 
Community during the period of recon-
struction after the Second World War. In 
others, the motivation may be more of 
an economic nature. 
Of the concept of economic integra-
tion, therefore, no single definition exists. 
For the purpose of the present note, any 
set of joint activities, promoted by com-
mon institutions, which raises the level 
of economic interdependence among a 
group of countries may be considered an 
integrating process. The degree of intensi-
ty of this process will be as great or as limi-
ted as the member countries may desire. 
(b) The various integration styles 
The Economic Commission for Latin 
America (CEPAL) has analysed the 
various development styles,5 but the 
subject of integration styles has not been 
exhaustively explored. They may, of 
course, embrace many possibilities with 
regard to the objectives pursued by the 
countries members of an integration 
movement. For analytical purposes, 
however, and at the risk of lapsing into a 
few generalizations, a distinction can be 
drawn between two major approaches, 
which in their turn embody three inte-
gration ' styles \ The first approach 
— integration at the 'micro' level, or by 
4See Jan Tinbergen, International Econo-
mic Intégration, Amsterdam, Elsevier Publish-
ing Co., 1965, p. 67. 
sSee CEPAL Review, N9 1, First Semester 
1976, United Nations publication, Sales N°: 
E. 76. II. G. 2. 
projects- aims at promoting interdepen-
dence through specific activities which 
involve an intrinsic benefit for the parti-
cipating countries, but which are not 
necessarily conceived as stages leading to 
the emergence of a larger unit. The second 
—'macro' or globalist integration— seeks 
to cover all aspects of development and to 
make them the object of common treat-
ment, although such treatment may be 
introduced progressively as part of a gra-
dual process. Within this second approach 
two variants or styles can be discerned as 
means of attaining the same objective: 
one of a liberal character, and the other 
entailing a higher degree of State partici-
pation. The three styles identified will be 
termed here: (i) the project approach; 
(iij market integration; and (iii) integra-
ted development, 
In any integration process traces of 
the three styles can be discovered. 
although one of them will always be 
predominant. At all events, it should be 
pointed out that they are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. 
(i) The project approach. This is 
based on the ex ecution of specific 
projects or on concrete activities which 
could not be carried out by a single 
country in equally efficient or appro-
priate conditions. The classic example is 
afforded by manufacturing industries for 
whose optimum operation the scale of 
production required is larger than could 
be absorbed by the domestic market of 
any given country. Sometimes the execu-
tion of a joint project calls for the 
adoption of complementary measures 
—in the case of industry cited above, free 
trade in the articles to be manufac-
tured- but the project approach is 
characterized by the intrinsic benefits for 
the participating countries implicit in 
each of the activities submitted to 
common treatment. These benefits can be 
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obtained without the necessity of 
agreeing upon across-the-board rules of 
the game (as, for example, a free-trade 
régime for all manufactured products). 
The foregoing approach contrasts 
with that of a global character, in the 
sense that the former is envisaged as 
upward integration, implying the imple-
mentation of joint action to solve 
common problems, basically through the 
execution of projects and programmes, 
whereas the latter places its main empha-
sis on a conception of gradual integra-
tion from the top downwards, i.e., 
seeking rather to reach agreements of a 
global type than to promote specific 
activities within the framework of these 
global agreements.6 
To put it more precisely, in integra-
tion by projects the immediate objec-
tives — pertaining to the execution of 
some specific activity— may be fitted 
into the framework of a broader strategy 
aimed at increasing interdependence 
among the countries. Thus, the difference 
between the project and the global 
approaches lies in the fact that the 
former devotes more attention to the 
sequences constituting development than 
to their ultimate outcome (on the basis, 
moreover, of the assumption that the 
execution of the joint projects which 
make for greater interdependence will 
influence or even transform the final 
objective). Hence in this approach the 
indication of a precise goal (for example, 
the constitution of a perfect customs 
union) is intentionally avoided, and the 
emphasis is placed, in the last analysis, 
on the benefits which can be obtained 
from each joint activity. 
6See CEPAL, Sugerencias para reactivara 
corto plazo la integración económica centro-
americana (E/CEPAL/CCE/367/Rev.3), April 
1975, pp. 50-51. 
Another important characteristic of the 
project approach is that it is envisaged as 
a complement to the development of each 
of the countries participating in a com-
mon project. In other words, the point of 
departure is the assumption that this type 
of integration should neither take the 
place of national development efforts nor, 
as far as possible, interfere with them. 
Moreover, the project approach 
makes it possible for the distribution 
problem inherent in any form of interde-
pendence amoung countries to be solved 
with relative efficacy, either through the 
selection of projects involving no costs 
for any country, or through the choice 
of a set of projects ensuring benefits for 
all. This aspect of the problem is 
discussed in greater detail at a later stage. 
Such a conception of economic 
integration finds its counterpart in 
functionalist theory on international 
organization, which considers that 
institutions must be created as a func-
tion of the needs which are to be jointly 
satisfied, and that the emphasis must be 
placed on transactions, not on legal 
instruments.7 According to this theory, 
what is important is to identify areas of 
co-operation which are of interest to all 
the participating States and preferably 
non-controversial. Once they have been 
identified, the agencies are established 
that are required for the attainment of 
the specific objectives fixed. 
As the goals to be pursued in 
common by the countries participating 
in a process of this nature may be of 
many kinds, the project approach calls 
for institutional decentralization. Since 
by definition these goals are of interest 
7
 See, inter alia, A.J. Groom and Paul 
Taylor, Functionalism: Theory and Practice in 
International Relations, London, University of 
London Press, 1974. 
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to all, it may be assumed that the partici-
pating States will voluntarily adopt the 
measures required for the execution of 
each project or joint activity, and that an 
integration scheme of this type does not 
necessitate regional institutions with supra-
national characteristics. Similarly, integra-
tion by projects allows of whatever degree 
of State intervention the participating 
countries may deem desirable, although a 
decisive role will be incumbent on the pub-
lic sector in negotiations relating to the 
location of the regional projects selected. 
(ii) The global approach: market 
integration and integrated development. 
The second major approach seeks to 
promote global integration of the whole 
production apparatus of the countries 
adopting it. Although in theory a 
possibility to be considered is that of 
* instantaneous ' integration -which 
would consist in the voluntary or enfor-
ced decision of a group of countries to 
adopt a federal plan immediately-, the 
process is most commonly conceived of as 
gradual and progressive. Its final objective 
is the constitution of a larger unit. 
This approach of course admits of 
variants, even as regards the degree of 
integration desired. In some instances 
partial and in others total economic 
unity might be the end pursued. Never-
theless, two clearly-defined 'styles' can 
be distinguished in this globalist approach, 
with many characteristics in common and 
some significant differences. 
What we have termed the 'market 
integration' approach is inspired by the 
theoretical writings of Viner and other 
authors on the formation of customs 
unions, within the broader field of 
studies relating to the international 
economy.8 It is the most usual both 
among industrialized countries (European 
Economic Community) and among devel-
oping countries. 
It consists in expanding the market 
size of several national units into an 
economy of regional dimensions for the 
participants. This integration may take 
various forms, which are normally regar-
ded as stages in one and the same 
process.9 The first step is the definition 
of a 'free-trade area' in which the mem-
ber countries eliminate tariff duties on 
products from the region itself, but 
maintain their own respective tariffs for 
products from third countries. The 
second is the 'customs union', which 
implies, in addition to free trade in the 
products of the region, a common tariff 
vis-a-vis the rest of the world.10 The 
third is the * common market ', the 
highest form of economic integration, in 
8
 See, inter alia, C.A. Cooper and B.F. 
Massel, "A New Look at Customs Union Theo-
ry", The Economic Journal Vol. LXXV, 
N° 300, December, 1965, pp. 742-747; Harry 
G. Johnson, "An Economic Theory of Protec-
tionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation 
of Customs Unions", The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. LXXIII, N° 3, June 1965, pp. 
256-283; Melvyn B. Krauss, "Recent Develop-
ments in Customs Union Theory: An Interpre-
tative Survey", Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol. X, N° 2, June 1972, pp. 413-434; R. G. 
Lipsey, "The Theory of Customs Unions: A 
General Survey", Economic Journal, Vol. LXX, 
N° 279, September 1960, pp. 496-513; James 
E. Meade, The Theory of Customs Unions, 
Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Co., 
1955, and Problems of Economic Union, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953; 
Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, New 
York, The Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 1950, especially pp. 41-55. 
9
 The description which follows is that 
given by Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic 
Integration, op.cit, p. 2, with which Tinbergen, 
International Economic Integration, op.cit,, 
p. 21, also concurs. As is shown later, however, 
not all writers are in agreement with the termi-
nology used. 
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which restrictions on trade and on move-
ments of capital and labour are suppres-
sed altogether. The * economic union ', 
lastly, combines all the foregoing with a 
high degree of harmonization of econo-
mic, monetary, fiscal, social and counter-
cyclical policies. 
Paradoxically enough, market inte-
gration has been sponsored both by 
those interested in liberalizing internatio-
nal trade11 - a s an initial stage in the 
elimination of tariff barriers between 
countries— and by those concerned with 
protecting nascent industries behind a 
common tariff barrier within an expanded 
market.12 
Despite the differences existing 
between these two criteria —one of 
which involves a free-trade area with 
little or no tariff protection, whereas the 
other calls for a common tariff barrier to 
protect industrial development- it is 
10
 In the writings of Lipsey, Meade and 
Viner, the term 'customs union' is understood 
to signify: (1) the elimination of tariff restric-
tions among the member countries for all 
products, irrespective of their origin; (2) the 
establishment of a common tariff vis-à-vis third 
countries; and (3) the establishment of machi-
nery for the collection of customs duties on 
products from the rest of the world, and the 
subsequent distribution of the said duties 
among the member countries. See, for example, 
Viner, The Customs Union Issue, op.cit., p. 5. 
11
 With some exceptions, including Viner 
himself, who argued that the formation of 
customs unions between blocs of countries was 
bound to lead, in the long run, to a less than 
optimum allocation of resources at the world 
level. 
12
 CEPAL, The Latin American Common 
Market (BICN, 12/532), United Nations publica-
tion, Sales N°: 59.II.G.4, especially pp. 1-7. 
CEPAL did not confine itself, of course, to 
promoting solely the integration style defined 
here as ' market integration * 
accepted in both cases that, within the 
free-trade area, market forces will 
spontaneously lead to an optimum 
reallocation of factors within the integra-
ted region, with the resultant improve-
ment in the efficiency of the production 
apparatus. An argument in favour of this 
integration approach (generally identi-
fied with economic liberalism) is to be 
found in the additional advantages of the 
more competitive régime engendered by 
the expanded market.13 
Where co-ordination of policies is 
concerned, an initial difference may be 
noted between the market integration 
and the integrated development styles. In 
the first case it is understood that certain 
economic policies need to be co-
ordinated and harmonized subsequently 
to the full liberalization of goods and 
factors, precisely in order to obviate 
distortions in the allocation of resources 
within the region. In the second, on the 
other hand, co-ordination of policies 
becomes a simultaneous —or even a 
prior— requisite for trade liberalization, 
since it is a more suitable mechanism for 
channelling the allocation of factors at 
the regional level and promoting gradual 
interdependence among the countries. In 
this sense, the style we have called 'inte-
grated development' places the emphasis 
on active measures to promote inter-
dependence— and to prevent, among 
other problems, unequal inter-country 
distribution of the benefits deriving from 
the process -as distinct from the more 
passive attitude implicit in market inte-
gration. But it is frequently argued that 
this latter approach is not appropriate for 
integration systems among developing 
countries, because of the defective 
13
 See Tibor Scitovsky, Economic Theory 
and Western European Integration, London, 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1958, pp. 1-15. 
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operation of their market mechanisms 
and the need to keep their development 
processes in balance with one another.14 
A second difference between the two 
' globalist ' systems derives precisely 
from the way in which the distribution 
problem is tackled under the process. It 
is in the market integration approach 
that the difficulties in this respect are 
greatest, because investment oriented by 
market forces logically tends to be 
concentrated in the countries that are 
relatively more developed or have larger 
markets. In contrast, in the case of inte-
grated development, as has already 
been pointed out, this problem —of 
cardinal importance for any integration 
movement— is handled by allocating 
investment so as to take into account, 
among other factors, the need to secure 
a reasonably equitable inter-country 
distribution of the benefits attributable 
to economic integration. 
A third difference —although one of 
nuance— between the two styles des-
cribed would appear to be the objectives 
of the process. According to the litera-
ture on market integration, the aim 
pursued is the raising of the level of 
well-being (with reference in the case of 
the free-traders to the well-being of the 
population of the whole world; on the 
part of the protectionists only to that of 
the population of the region), although 
the formation of the customs union 
often seems to become an objective 
per se. The integrated development style 
has as its explicit objective the accelera-
tion of the economic and social 
14
 See Hiroshi Kitamura, "La teoría econó-
mica y la integración económica de las regiones 
subdesarrolladas", in M. Wionczek et al, Inte-
gración de América Latina, experiencias y pers-
pectivas, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1964, pp. 26-49. 
development of the countries members 
of an integration movement, and is 
oriented towards the optimization of 
economic policy as a whole. 
It would be a mistake to deduce 
from the foregoing remarks that the inte-
grated development approach -some-
times described as ' dirigist ,IS - can be 
applied solely in a centrally-directed 
economic system. Only by comparison 
with the market integration approach is 
its higher relative degree of State inter-
vention brought out, and this interven-
tion, moreover, may be substantial or 
moderate, at the discretion of the States 
participating in the process. 
In the two integration systems des-
cribed under the head of the globalist 
approach, the process is conceived as 
incremental or linear; that is, one miles-
tone is infallibly followed by another on 
the road towards the construction of a 
larger unit. As progress is made in the 
stages envisaged, it is argued, the level 
and scope of the process increase, 
because the activities subject to common 
treatment spill over into new sectors or 
because they are carried out in greater 
depth in a specific sector.16 Thus, to 
cite only two examples, and in accordance 
with neofunctionalist theory, for com-
mercial integration to be successful it 
would necessarily have to spill over into 
monetary and agricultural integration. 
With regard to the institutional 
framework which normally accompanies 
15
 See The Theory of Economie Integra-
tion, op.cit., pp. 8-11. 
16
 See Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Process 
of Central American Integration: Spill-over or 
Spill-around? ", Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. IX, N° 1, September 1970, pp. 
1-48. Lack of spill-over or regression is what is 
described as 'spill-back', while stagnation is 
termed ' spill-around \ 
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the globalist approach, two variants may 
be noted which are applicable alike to the 
market integration style and to the inte-
grated development approach. Both start 
from the assumption that, as the process 
advances, governments will have to 
delegate increasing responsibilities to a 
common institution. In the case of the 
integrated development style, the trans-
fer of faculties will have to begin at a 
very early stage in the process, to meet 
the requirements of co-ordination of 
policies, whereas in market integration, 
it may take place in the more advanced 
phases. 
The first variant of the transfer of 
national powers to regional institutions 
has its source in federalist theory.17 This 
legalist criterion for the construction of 
larger inter-State communities asserts the 
need to begin by establishing strong 
federal institutions and a basic constitu-
tion. The existence of overcentralization 
of powers is not necessarily implied 
-although neither is it excluded-, 
because, as is common knowledge, every 
genuine federation entails a permanent 
tension between the powers of the fede-
ral institutions and those of the member 
States. In some instances, governments 
confer only partial faculties on the 
federal institutions —where a confede-
ration is concerned- and in others the 
most important are handed over to 
them. 
The second variant -much more 
closely linked to the economic integration 
process— finds its inspiration in neofunc-
tionalist theory.18 According to this an 
17
 See Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regio-
nal Integration: Reflections on the Joys & 
Anguish of Pre-theorizing", International Orga-
nization, Vol. XXIV, N°4, Autumn 1970, 
Boston, World Peace Foundation, pp. 607-646. 
18
 See Ernst B, Haas, Beyond the Nation-
State: Functionalism and International Organi-
integration movement starting with joint 
activities in non-controversial areas may 
end in the spill-over described above 
because of the very dynamics of the 
process. "Members of an integration 
scheme -agreed on some collective goals 
for a variety of motives but unequally 
satisfied with their attainment of these 
goals- attempt to resolve this dissatisfac-
tion either by resorting to collaboration 
in another related sector (expanding the 
scope of the mutual commitment) or by 
intensifying their commitment to the 
original sector (increasing the level of the 
mutual commitment), or both."19 Such 
a process necessitates, with the passage 
of time, the gradual creation of 
increasingly powerful institutions, as the 
governments step up their common 
action or submit new activities to joint 
treatment. In other words, the 'globa-
list' approach to integration calls for the 
existence of institutions which, at least 
at the more advanced stages of the 
process, have certain supranational 
characteristics so that fulfilment of the 
commitments assumed by the member 
governments can be guaranteed. 
In conclusion, it should be pointed 
out that as a general rule certain prior 
conditions facilitating an integration 
process are assumed to exist, such as, for 
example, a measure of homogeneity in 
the size and development characteristics 
of the countries members of the move-
ment, their geographical proximity, their 
historical and cultural links and their 
community of interests vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world. From this point of view, 
zation, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press 
1964. 
19
 See Philippe C. Schmitter, "Three Neo-
Functional Hypotheses about International 
Integration", International Organization, Vol. 
XXIII, N° 1, Winter 1969, p. 166. 
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circumstances suggest that integration is 
more viable in Central America than, for 
example, at the Latin American level.20 
An essay on this subject is a venture 
not unattended by risks. It might prove 
somewhat pretentious; moreover, in 
many instances the facts of the case do 
not lend themselves to explanations 
that can be tidily pigeonholed within a 
theoretical or conceptual framework. 
(a) Past experience: integration styles 
tried out 
The theoretical approaches described 
in the foregoing paragraphs do not in 
reality appear in 'pure' form. Thus, what 
has been called the 'project approach' 
may, in a given case, show characteristics 
more proper to 'market integration' or 
'integrated development', and vice versa. 
In fact, when conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks are compared with actual 
experience, what emerges is a 'mix' of 
the styles described, in which the charac-
teristics of one of them usually 
predominate. 
This is the case in Central America, 
where trial has been made of the 'project 
20
 For two recent examples, see: Eduardo 
Lizano (éd.), La integración económica centro-
americana, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Eco-
nómica, 1972, two volumes; and Edelberto 
Torres R. (éd.). Centroamérica hoy, Mexico City, 
Siglo XXI, 1975. See also Revista de la Integra-
ción Centroamericana, published periodically by 
the Central American Bank for Economic Inte-
gration (various issues). 
Accordingly, all that is proposed in the 
present note is to clarify some concepts 
which may be among those brought up 
for discussion, during the next few 
months, with respect to the future of the 
integration programme, in the context of 
the draft treaty on the establishment of 
an economic and social community in 
Central America.21 
approach' -exemplified in the Central 
American Highway Plan or the regional 
telecommunications network-; 'market 
integration' -exemplified in the General 
Treaty on Central American Economic 
Integration-; and 'integrated develop-
ment', exemplified in the work done from 
1962 to 1966 by the OAS/IDB/CEPAL 
Joint Programming Mission. 
Evidence of this diversity in methods 
of tackling integration in Central Ameri-
ca can be found in many documents. In 
the very first resolution adopted by 
CEPAL on the possibility of promoting 
economic integration, the governments 
of the region expressed their interest "in 
the development of agricultural and 
industrial production and of transporta-
tion systems in their respective countries 
so as to promote the integration of their 
21
 See High-Level Committee on the 
Restructuration of the Central American 
Common Market, Proyecto de Tratado de la 
Comunidad Económica y Social Centroame-
ricana, Guatemala, Permanent Secretariat of the 
General Treaty on Central American Economie 
Integration (SiEC A), 23 March 1976. 
2. 
The concept of economic integration 
applied to Central America 
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economies and the expansion of markets 
by the exchange of their products ['mar-
ket integration'], the co-ordination of 
their development programmes ['inte-
grated development'], and the establish-
ment of enterprises in which all or some 
of these countries have an interest 
['integration by projects']...".22 
At the same time, the first concrete 
measures were adopted to give impetus 
both to integration by projects -i .e. , 
establishment of enterprises- and to 
market integration -~i.e., exchange of 
products. Thus, on the one hand, in 
1952 the Economic Co-operation Com-
mittee requested its secretariat to take 
steps to formulate specific projects for 
the establishment of new industries,23 
and during the next three years it ap-
proved projects for the setting-up of two 
regional institutions.24 On the other 
hand, between 1951 and 1954, on the 
initiative of the governments concerned, 
bilateral trade treaties were signed which 
implied the objective of forming a cus-
toms union.25 
22
 Resolution 9 (IV) of the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America (CEPAL), adopted 
on 16 June 1961. The notes in square brackets 
have been added to make the terms used in the 
present paper more comprehensible. 
"Resolution 2 (AC. 17), adopted on 27 
August 195'2. 
24
 The Central American Technological 
Research Institute for Industry (Instituto 
Centroamericano de Investigación y Tecnología 
Industrial - ICAITI) (1965) and the Advanced 
School of Public Administration for Central 
America (Escuela Superior de Administración 
Pública de América Central - ESAPAC) 
(1957). 
25
 Bilateral treaties between El Salvador 
and Nicaragua (29 August, 1951), between El 
Salvador and Guatemala (17 March 1952), and 
between El Salvador and Costa Rica (18 
February 1954). 
Towards the middle of the decade, 
the determination to adopt various 
approaches to integration found even 
more explicit expression in a resolution 
in which the governments decided to 
reaffirm their interest in the preserva-
tion, within the Central American 
Economic Integration Programme as a 
whole, of a proper proportion between 
basic projects of an institutional type 
and those relating to the promotion of 
productive activities and the establish-
ment of new industries appropriate to 
the Central American region.26 
Similarly, the CEPAL secretariat 
-which was at the same time the secre-
tariat of the Economic Co-operation 
Committee- noted several points in 
documents produced by it around that 
date. 
"A concept of economic integra-
tion", it was observed, "adequate asa 
starting-point in the case of Central 
America, would provide for limited 
integration allied with a policy of 
commercial and industrial recipro-
city. ... Limited economic integration 
implies a policy which, within the 
26
 Resolution 8 (CCE) of 7 May 1965. In 
commenting on this resolution, the secretariat 
said that the problem of proportion was in 
essence a matter of order and opportune timing 
in the execution of these different types of 
projects. Admittedly, both had to be and had 
been included in the programme, but the date 
and pace of their execution might be gradually 
modified so that a reasonable proportion 
between them could be continuously main-
tained. The promotion of projects of the one 
type relatively sooner than the other presented 
advantages and drawbacks which would have to 
be carefully weighed before their order of 
development was determined. See the docu-
ment La integración económica de Centro-
américa, Su evolución y perspectivas (E/CN.12/ 
CCE/33/Rev.2;E/CN.l2/422), 1956, p. 28. 
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general objectives of economic 
development, shall be directed to 
considering the optimum location 
for some of the outstanding econo-
mic activities (especially manufactu-
ring industries, as well as those 
transforming agricultural and mineral 
products...)"-27 
Elsewhere it was stated that the con-
stitution of a common customs 
territory was logically one of the 
indispensable elements of integra-
tion, and that the governments had 
deemed it necessary to achieve it 
gradually through the conclusion of 
bilateral free-trade treaties.28 
Another view expressed was that "it 
will not be possible to increase reci-
procal trade on a sound basis 
without an intensification of the 
efforts made to integrate and co-
ordinate the economic development 
of Central America".29 
Hence it can be deduced that the 
secretariat was exploring the possibility 
of promoting at one and the same time 
progress through all three approaches des-
cribed above: the project approach, the 
market integration approach and the 
integrated development approach. 
Nevertheless, from 1955 to 1958 a 
gradual change was observable in the 
proposals formulated by the secretariat 
and in the action taken by the govern-
ments. In 1955, for example, it was still 
27
 See CEPAL, Preliminary report of the 
Executive Secretary of the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America on economic integra-
tion and reciprocity in Central America (E/ 
CN.12/AC.17/3), 1 August 1952, p. 35. 
28
 See CEPAL, Política comercial y libre 
comercio en Centroamérica (E/CN.12/368), 20 
July 1955, p. 118. 
29
 See CEPAL, Analysis and prospects of 
inter-Central American trade (E/CN.12/367), 
20 July 1955, p. 27. 
recognized that the programme adopted 
from the outset by the Committee was 
of an essentially limited nature in 
present circumstances. A customs union 
was not envisaged as an immediate possi-
bility, nor was the unification of fiscal, 
administrative, banking or other services. 
Integration had been conceived in a 
rather narrow sense, focusing mainly on 
integration in the industrial field.30 In 
1958, on the other hand, it was asserted 
that obviously, if integration were to be 
achieved, the countries seeking it would 
at least have to reach an agreement 
among themselves which would enable 
them to expand their reciprocal markets, 
with the ultimate aim of forming a 
customs union and a common market.31 
It was not that the multiple approach to 
integration had been given up -during 
this period, the secretariat identified 
specific projects in eleven branches of 
industry and proposed mechanisms for 
their execution, which led the govern-
ments to sign a Régime for Central 
American Integration Industries— but 
both the CEPAL secretariat and the 
governments seemed to lean increasingly 
towards a globalist system, with pre-
established targets, and an incrementalist 
conception of the road to integration 
(although great care was taken to distin-
guish between activities directly linked 
to the integration process and those 
which were considered of an exclusively 
national character).32 Within this global-
30
 See La integración económica en Centro-
américa. Su evolución y perspectivas, op.cit., 
p. 6. 
31
 See CEPAL, Informe general de la secre-
taría sobre el Programa de In tegraciôn 
(E/CN.12/CCE/113),May 1958, p. 4. 
32
 See CEPAL, Estado general del Progra-
ma de Integración del Istmo Centroamericano 
(E/CN.12/CCE/71), February 1957, for a state-
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ist view, the governments seemed 
inclined to favour market integration, 
that is, the free exchange of products, 
whereas the secretariat apparently con-
sidered integrated development more 
advisable.33 
In the course of the rapid sequence 
of events which led first to the signing of 
the Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade - a 
selective mechanism for the liberalization 
of t r a d e - and then to the Treaty on 
Economic Association and the General 
Treaty on Central American Economic 
Integration - au toma t i c liberalization 
mechanisms- the market integration 
criterion of the Central American 
governments was consolidated The last 
instrument named —compatible with 
article XXIV of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade ( G A T T ) - was 
aimed at perfecting a Central American 
common market within a period of five 
ment to the effect that the task of formulating 
an integration programme with practical 
possibilities therefore consisted in identifying, 
on the one hand, the problems which could and 
would have to be dealt with at the regional level, 
and, on the other hand, those whose solutions, 
although dependent upon national decisions, 
might affect the situation of the whole 
Isthmus. 
33
 "The (Central American Economic Inte-
gration) Programme may also be considered as 
an attempt to co-ordinate and supplement the 
economic development of the five Central 
American countries as a joint undertaking. Such 
a view presupposes that each country has 
formulated its national development plans as a 
co-ordinated whole, (and) that a high degree of 
co-ordination in the matter of economic policy 
will be gradually evolved..." See CEPAL, 
"Central American Economic Integration 
Programme: evaluation and prospects" 
(E/CN.12/CCE/160), Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America, Vol. IV, N° 2, October 1959, 
p. 34. 
years (in respect both of the free trade 
area and of the adoption of a common 
tariff) and at the formation of a customs 
union, although no deadline was fixed for 
this. Notwithstanding that in the Treaty 
all the provisions of the Régime for Inte-
gration Industries and of the treaty 
establishing the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration were ratified, 
since it was considered that they would 
facilitate the implementation of a system 
with some of the characteristics of inte-
grated development, there can be no 
doubt that the Régime was greatly 
weakened by the securing of free trade for 
almost all products. 
The Central American Integration 
Programme continued to undergo many 
adaptations during the 1960s. Integra-
tion by projects was given some impetus 
through the execution of the Central 
American Highway Plan, the entry into 
operation of a radio-aids service for air-
craft and the signing of the agreement 
which permitted the construction of the 
Central American telecommunications 
network. An attempt was also made to 
give greater importance to integrated 
development when the governments 
decided to form a Joint Programming 
Mission for Central America —with the 
support of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America 
(CEPAL)- which was set up for the 
two-fold purpose of providing advisory 
assistance k> the countries in the formu-
lation of trjeir development plans, and 
co-ordinating those plans with the eco-
nomic integration programme.34 Appa-
34
 See resolution N° 2 of the Central Ame-
rican Economic Council, adopted on 28 July 
1962. In November 1965 the same Council 
decided to institutionalize the work of the 
Mission by fully incorporating it in SIECA. 
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rently, however, the Mission had more 
success in collaborating with the five 
countries of the region in the formula-
tion of their own national development 
plans -almost a prerequisite for 
obtaining access to the external resour-
ces stemming from the programme 
known as the Alliance for Progress-
than in securing the harmonization of 
those plans in relation to specific integra-
tion objectives.35 Moreover, the inte-
gration variable hardly appeared in the 
national plans formulated with the 
collaboration of the Joint Mission.36 
In short, despite the multiplicity of 
the approaches to Central American inte-
gration simultaneously tried out during 
the 1960s, the integration 'style' which 
predominated was manifestly the one we 
have described here as * market inte-
gration". 
35
 See the annual reports submitted to the 
Advisory Committee by the Chief of the Joint 
Programming Mission for Central America in 
October 1962, March 1963, July 1963, March 
1964 and December 1965. One of the signs of 
the relatively slight impact produced by the 
Mission in the field of joint programming is that 
the national planning authorities, which met 
together on only two occasions throughout the 
whole of the 1960s, never even had before 
them the document on a regional development 
strategy prepared during 1966. A summary of 
the activities of the Mission may be found in 
Alberto Fuentes-Mohr, "Una tentativa de plani-
ficación multinacional: la Misión Conjunta de 
Programación para Centroamérica", Revista 
Interamericana de Planificación, Vol. VIII, 
N° 32, Bogotá, Colombia, Sociedad Interame-
ricana de Planificación, December 1974. 
36
 See Panel of Nine of the Alliance for 
Progress, Informe sobre los planes nacionales de 
desarrollo y el proceso de integración econó-
mica de Centroamérica, Washington, D.C., 
General Secretariat of the Organization of 
American States (OAS), August 1966, espe-
cially pp. 1-8. 
(b) Appraisals of the application of the 
conceptual frame of reference to the 
evolution of the process 
It is interesting to contrast the expe-
rience acquired in the course of 20 years 
of integration in Central America with 
the evolution of this process predictable 
in the light of the theoretical considera-
tions summarized above. An analysis on 
these lines may help to clarify the nature 
of the crisis through which Central 
American integration is passing and 
contribute experience and background 
information which may perhaps provide 
guidance for the future progress of the 
movement. 
Four major areas of the integration 
process account for what might be consi-
dered its ' crisis': (i) lack of spill-over; 
(ii) failure to cover the stages envisaged; 
(iii) distribution problems; and (iv) its 
insufficient depth, and the tensions that 
have developed between centralizing and 
decentralizing tendencies. 
(i) Lack of spill-over. With regard to 
the first aspect of the problem, 
according to the neofunctionalist theory 
referred to above, the very dynamics of 
the process would require a steadily 
increasing number of activities and sec-
tors to be submitted to common treat-
ment; that is, its scope would have to be 
constantly enlarged. Nevertheless, one of 
the characteristics of integration in 
Central America -bo th during the 
formative years and, to a greater extent 
still, from 1966 to the present day- has 
lain precisely in the fact that deliberate 
attempts to extend its scope to new 
areas have proved difficult and fragmen-
tary, and that very little spontaneous 
spill-over has occurred.37 Events in 
See Sugerencias para reactivar a corto 
plazo la integración económica centroame-
ricana, op.cit, pp. 38-43. 
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Central America show that rapid strides 
were made towards the formation of a 
common market —the market integration 
described in the preceding sect ion- as 
well as in the joint treatment of activities 
directly linked to trade (the construction 
of the road network, the establishment 
of a clearing-house, and the harmoniza-
tion of the fiscal incentives applied to 
new industrial plants), and that at the 
same time, despite the efforts of regional 
institutions and some specific lines of 
government action, little success atten-
ded the proposal to extend the process 
effectively to other sectors or activities 
(agriculture, energy, harmonization of 
development policies and of tax systems, 
common external trade policy). 
It would seem that after a period of 
rapid - e v e n spectacular- progress in the 
formation of a perfect free-trade area 
and the adoption of a common tariff, by 
the mid-1960s the integration process had 
apparently reached the limit of its possi-
bilities, and that thenceforward, instead 
of broadening its scope, it even lost some 
of the ground gained. For this pheno-
menon - w h i c h is the contrary of what 
might have been expected in accordance 
with the theoretical framework pre-
viously described- two basic explana-
tions might be found. 
The first is that the governments 
were unwilling to adopt global decisions 
whose consequences they could not 
measure, or as to whose potential bene-
fits they probably entertained doubts. 
For example, no government showed 
interest in promoting any tax harmoniza-
tion programme, doubtless because it 
might have implied, among other disad-
vantages, potential losses of revenue. Nor 
was headway made during the past 
fifteen years in any scheme for speciali-
zation in agricultural production, because 
each government was anxious to attain 
national self-sufficiency in respect of 
basic foods.38 Furthermore, the degree 
of economic interdependence among the 
countries of the area was not yet such 
that governments were disposed to 
exchange the real and immediate bene-
fits deriving from a specific activity 
undertaken at the national level for 
potentially greater future benefits deri-
ving from more efficient conduct of the 
same activity at the regional level. Thus, 
a prerequisite for subjecting any new 
activity to common treatment was to 
show that direct benefit would result for 
each and all of the countries of the 
region, which was very rarely the case. 
The second explanation —of a poli-
tical n a t u r e - might be that the most 
effective way of subjecting a specific 
activity or sector to common treatment 
is to hand over faculties partly or entire-
ly to regional institutions so that they 
may have at their disposal mechanisms 
to ensure implementation of the deci-
sions adopted; unfortunately, the story of 
Central American integration abounds in 
evidence of the governments' reluctance 
to transfer powers to such institutions. 
The General Treaty did not provide for 
- o r contempla te- the establishment of 
supranational organs; the intergovern-
mental organs envisaged in the Treaty 
merely delegated certain powers to the 
Permanent Secretariat in isolated cases 
38
 This circumstance was highlighted 
during the period 1972-1974, when a drought, 
combined with distortions on the world market 
and notable increases in the costs of agricultural 
inputs, brought about a widespread dearth of 
basic grains in the area. At that juncture, the 
export of these commodities from one Central 
American country to another was described in 
the exporter country as * contraband ', both by 
government sources and in the press. 
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and in relation to highly specific 
matters.39 Moreover, despite the obvious 
need —frequently pointed out in Central 
America— to adopt some procedure for 
rapidly and flexibly modifying the 
Central American common tariff, the 
governments never managed to reach 
agreement on this very limited transfer of 
national faculties to a regional organ, 
even though it was an intergovernmental 
organ like the Economic Council that 
was concerned. Other examples might be 
cited, such as the unwillingness of one 
government to entrust part of its foreign 
trade policy to joint treatment,40 and the 
refusal of another to submit its decision 
to change the parity of its currency for 
approval by a regional organ - t h e 
Central American Monetary Council.41 
It is also worth while to mention the 
valiant effort made in the mid-1960s to 
set up a regional telecommunications 
corporation, which in the end found 
expression in five national projects, 
co-ordinated by an intergovernment-
al commission (Comisión Técnica 
39
 See Guatama Fonseca and Dante Rami-
rez, "Los órganos del Tratado General de 
In t egración Económica Centroamericana", 
Derecho de la integración, N° 6, Buenos Aires, 
April 1970, p, 93. 
40
 See the report of a meeting on trade 
negotiations, held at Managua, on 30 April and 
1 May 1974, between representatives of the 
Central American Governments and the Special 
Representative of the President of the United 
States of America. 
41
 See SIEGA, Exposición del Banco Cen-
tral de Costa Rica sobre las medidas sugeridas 
para corregir los problemas de balanza de pagos 
y fiscal, Tegucigalpa, 6-7 January 1967; Execu-
tive Secretariat of the Central American 
Monetary Council, Implicaciones de las medidas 
cambiarías adoptadas por Costa Rica el 19 de 
junio de 1971, Memorandum 9-71, San José, 22 
June 1971. 
de Telecomunicaciones de Centro-
américa - COMTELCA). Lastly, it 
should be noted that decisions adopted 
by the Executive Council to settle con-
flicts arising out of free trade were often 
disregarded by the governments which 
had voted against them, and this led to 
open (and frequent) violations of the 
trade régime.42 In conclusion, stress 
must be laid on the vicious circle created 
by the causes and effects of the limited 
scope of integration in .Central America. 
On the one hand, the lack of spill-over 
has been reflected in narrow sectoral 
coverage of the activities subject to 
common treatment, with the result that 
integration has not much significance for 
national authorities linked to the sectors 
left out (for example, the Ministers of 
Agriculture and of Finance, and the 
Planning Directors). For this reason, pre-
sumably, they have taken little interest in 
the process and have devoted all their 
attention to tackling development pro-
blems from a national standpoint. On 
the other hand, the fact that most 
government authorities have neither 
found integration of any assistance in 
solving the problems with which they are 
confronted in the performance of their 
everyday tasks, nor become thoroughly 
familiarized with its objectives, mecha-
nisms and scope, has undoubtedly 
helped to make the deliberate extension 
of the process to new sectors an even 
more difficult matter. 
(ii) Failure to cover the stages envi-
saged The second element in the Central 
42
 See Francisco Villagrán Kramer, "Los 
procedimientos que de hecho se utilizan en el 
Mercado Común Centroamericano", La solu-
ción de conflictos en la integración latino-
americana, Buenos Aires, Inter-American Deve-
lopment Bank/Institute for Latin American Inte-
gration, (IDB/INTAL), 1972, pp. 25-174. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION / Cohen, Rosenthal 35 
American integration * crisis ', closely 
linked to the preceding factor, is the 
failure to cover the stages envisaged (a 
perfect common market within five years' 
time, as from I960, and gradual evolu-
tion towards a customs union). The 
adoption of targets and stages is a typical 
reflex of the purpose of progressively 
enlarging the scope of the process - t h e 
' incrementalist ' view- which characte-
rizes both market integration and the 
integrated development approach. This 
expectation of spill-over carried with it, 
in Central America's experience, two 
serious disadvantages: it gave rise to 
exaggerated suppositions regarding 
integration, and introduced rigidities 
into the process. These two observations 
will next be discussed. 
In the first place, the conception of 
integration as a linear and cumulative 
process -which was the idea that actual-
ly prevailed in Central America- rules 
out the possibility of recognizing that a 
process of this type may, at a given 
moment, become stabilized or reach its 
break-even point. If this latter characte-
ristic had been admitted, perhaps it would 
not have been felt towards the end of 
the 1960s that integration had entered 
upon a critical stage. On the contrary, 
the Central American Programme has 
done better, in a very short space 
of time, than any other subregional inte-
gration movement in the developing 
world. It might well be argued that the 
process in question reached its break-
even point in 1966, and that the 
governments could have declared them-
selves satisfied with the results, without, 
for the moment, seeking to carry the 
movement any further. It is when 
achievements are compared with the 
expectations aroused -wi th the notion 
that the process must inevitably continue 
expanding- that one can understand the 
sometimes unduly facile use of epithets 
such as ' crisis ' and ' fracaso '. 43 
Secondly, the rigidity introduced by 
linear and cumulative progress towards a 
predetermined goal consists in the fact 
that all the efforts of governments and 
regional institutions are concentrated 
upon the attainment of the goal in ques-
tion, sometimes at the expense of other 
activities which might even be of greater 
importance for the integration move-
ment. It should be recalled that in 
Central America's case the process of 
perfecting the Common Market had by 
the mid-1960s acquired so compelling a 
logic of its own that sometimes the 
constitution of a customs union seemed 
to become an objective per se. Such a 
conviction has the drawback of blinding 
those who hold it to other additional 
objectives, as in fact happened in Central 
America. Thus, when some countries 
began to call in question the desirability 
of a customs union, the Programme, 
victim of its own approach, could not 
redefine its objectives, nor immediately 
incorporate into the tasks of integration 
activities which had not been contem-
plated in the General Treaty. 
Lastly, the experience of the 1960s 
has shown that the evolution of the 
process, apart from not necessarily 
leading to the formation of a larger unit, 
permitted in the course of time the 
emergence of factors which actually 
detracted from its viability. Thus, with 
the increase in the size of the national 
markets - for example, in 1975 Guate-
mala's gross domestic product was 
similar to that of the entire area in 
43
 Admittedly, of course, other factors nur-
tured the increasing dissatisfaction with the 
operation of the Common Market. Some of 
them -especially the distribution problem-
will be discussed below. 
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1955-, specific branches of activity 
were able to operate with reasonable 
margins of economic efficiency on a 
domestic market basis, and as from the 
close of the 1960s there were signs that 
each of the Central American countries 
was going in for industrialization with a 
view to substituting domestic production 
for imports from the rest of the Com-
mon Market, while the relative share of 
inter-Central American trade in the 
foreign trade of the area has been stea-
dily declining since 1971. 
(iii) Distribution problems. The 
third element in the integration crisis is 
the well-known distribution phenome-
non. As has already been noted, any 
scheme for interdependence is bound to 
generate problems of this type among its 
members, and the scope of such pro-
blems in the case under review needs 
defining. It is untrue that in an integra-
tion process like that of Central America 
costs for specific countries are necessari-
ly reflected in benefits for the rest; as 
was pointed out in a recent document, 
the programme distributes the costs and 
benefits of integration unevenly, to the 
disadvantage of a particular country, a 
circumstance which, far from resulting in 
net benefits for the rest, becomes on the 
contrary a source of cumulative costs 
which affect them unfavourably.44 And 
this has in fact happened in Central 
America; the relative poverty of at least 
one of the member countries has tended 
to become a cost that hampers the satis-
factory progress of the entire Common 
Market. 
Undoubtedly, the present situation 
must be partly attributed to the integra-
44
 See CEPAL, Planteamientos y posibles 
medidas en torno al problema del desarrollo 
equilibrado en Centroamerica (CEPAL/MEX/ 
74/22), November 1974, p. 8. 
tion style prevailing in the region 
—market integration— since it is the one 
that makes it most difficult to cope with 
a distribution problem such as that des-
cribed above. Since the operation of free 
trade was left to the mercy of market 
forces - i t should be recalled that one of 
the few corrective mechanisms at the 
disposal of the scheme, i.e., the Régime 
for Integration Industries, was hardly 
applied in practice during the 1960s-
the new investments encouraged by the 
expanded market were channelled 
towards the areas or countries which had 
the biggest market and the best develo-
ped physical and human infrastructure. 
It would be unfair, however, to 
impute the Central American distribu-
tion problem solely to the integration 
style adopted during the 1960s. Those 
same circumstances that helped to limit 
the scope of the process would almost 
have rendered inoperative a different 
' style ' such as the integrated develop-
ment approach -which in theory at least 
tackles the distribution problem-, 
because the co-ordination of policies for 
distributive purposes entails submitting 
some lines of action to common treat-
ment, and that would have necessitated 
the delegation of national powers to 
regional agencies. As shown above, past 
experience suggests that such a situation 
would have been unlikely to materialize. 
A higher degree of co-ordination of 
policies, especially at the level of joint 
formulation of national development 
plans, is attractive and desirable as a 
means of pushing ahead with integration 
and at the same time securing better 
distribution of its costs and benefits 
among the member countries. Neverthe-
less, it would also be a mistake to pin 
exaggerated hopes to a reorientation of 
this type in the Central American integra-
tion 'style', at least to judge from the brief 
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experience of the Joint Programming 
Mission. In the first place, because ove-
rall development planning is still on a 
shaky footing, even at the level of the 
individual countries, and because the 
incorporation of integration objectives in 
such plans does not necessarily mean 
that subsequent official action will be in 
line with them. Secondly, the integration 
variable - a l t hough of increasing impor-
t a n c e - still carries relatively little weight 
in the individual Central American eco-
nomies,45 and it is perhaps for that 
reason that the region's planning experts 
have shown a marked tendency to 
regard integration as a mere appendix to 
national economic development, and to 
continue following this criterion in eco-
nomic and social development planning. 
Thirdly, the consensual character of any 
integration movement precludes the 
possibility of strict programming of the 
members* commitments, since every 
proposal will have to pass through the 
natural process of negotiation. Lastly, 
even if a consensus were reached with 
respect to a regional development pro-
gramme, a centralized agency would 
have to be established - a community 
organ endowed with supranational 
power s - with sufficient authority to 
enforce its implementation by the parti-
cipants: a very unlikely eventuality, to 
judge from what has happened in the 
past. 
These indications of the potential 
limitations of joint programming are 
corroborated by the experience of other 
integration movements in which care has 
45
 In 1975, the proportion of the gross 
domestic product represented by exports to the 
rest of the Common Market was as follows: 
Guatemala, 4.4 per cent; El Salvador, 5.1 per 
cent; Honduras, 2.1 per cent; Nicaragua, 5.6 per 
cent; and Costa Rica, 4.6 per cent. 
been taken to confine the area of joint 
programming to the activities strictly 
necessary to make integration work well. 
In the Andean Group, for example, 
where exceptional importance has been 
assigned to what are termed sectoral 
industrial development programmes, 
joint programming has in fact been 
applied only to a few projects or sub-
branches of industry which are conside-
red to be of primary importance for the 
progress of integration.46 Even the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) - a n integration movement 
among countries with centrally-directed 
economies— formulates joint plans of 
limited scope. Thus, a recent CMEA 
publication notes that socialist economic 
integration is effected on an entirely 
voluntary basis and is not accompanied 
by the formation of supranational 
agencies, nor does it affect problems 
related to internal planning or to activi-
ties in the field of finance and financial 
self-management.47 
To sum up, during the 1960s the 
integration style adopted did not allow 
mechanisms to be brought into force 
which would promote better-balanced 
development as between the Central 
American countries, and doubt may be 
felt, for reasons noted above, as to the 
efficacy of the mechanisms that might 
be introduced under a style more closely 
linked to integrated development. 
(iv) The insufficient depth of the 
process. The fourth and last element in 
46
 See Board of the Cartagena Agreement, 
"Bases generales para una estrategia subregional 
de desarrollo", Andean Group, Separata N0. 11, 
May 1972, p. 5. 
47
 See CMEA, Programa complejo de pro-
fundizarían y perfeccionamiento de la colabo-
ración y de desarrollo de la integración econó-
mica socialista de los países del CAME, 
Moscow, Editorial Progreso, 1972, p. 13. 
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the Central American integration crisis 
is to be found in the insufficient depth 
of the process and in the tensions that 
have arisen between centralizing and 
decentralizing tendencies, the term 
' depth ' being understood to mean the 
extent to which governments confer 
powers on regional institutions.48 In this 
connexion, the evolution of Central 
American integration institutions would 
seem to reveal two basic facts. Firstly, 
the Programme cannot be said to have 
resulted in increased delegation of facul-
ties or powers to regional institutions, as 
might have been expected in the light of 
neofunctionalist theory. Secondly, it is 
endowed with a decentralized institu-
tional structure, which has also been the 
object of centralizing aspirations that 
have had to remain unfulfilled. 
The first of these characteristics has 
been reflected in little power of initia-
tive, limited financial autonomy and 
restricted capacity to ensure implemen-
tation of the decisions adopted. In 
consequence of their scant power of 
initiative, for example, the regional insti-
tutions have not attempted to go beyond 
the limited objectives which the consti-
tuting instruments had assigned to the 
Programme, and this in its turn has led 
to over-concentration of attention on 
monitoring the execution of the original 
commitments. The lack of financial 
autonomy has been evidenced in a high 
degree of dependence on government 
contributions (and, in default of them, 
on external sources). Lastly, it was largely 
due to the governments' reluctance to 
accept any solution of a supranational 
character that the institutions were not 
granted the necessary powers to enforce 
48
 See Sugerencias para reactivar a corto 
plazo la integración económica centroameri-
cana, op.cit., p. 36. 
the implementation of decisions adopted 
by common accord. Hence it has been a 
characteristic of the process that impor-
tant decisions adopted have often 
become a dead letter, or, again, agree-
ments or treaties formally signed have 
remained unratified for long periods, and 
even when their ratification has been 
secured it has not been possible to put 
them into operation. 
In short, the institutional evolution 
of Central American integration makes it 
evident that between the attempts of the 
regional institutions to acquire greater 
powers and the tenacious opposition of 
governments to the granting of such 
faculties a tug-of-war has taken place, in 
which the governments have ultimately 
been victorious. 
Furthermore, in institutional res-
pects the process betrays a tension 
-apparently unresolved- between the 
existence of a decentralized institutional 
framework and the endeavours made to 
introduce some degree of co-ordination 
through centralization. This tension may 
be said to have accompanied the integra-
tion process from its very birth, when 
the tasks relating to economic integra-
tion were kept separate from those 
aimed at political unification, the two 
types of activity being pursued in diffe-
rent forums and institutions and with 
little co-ordination between them. It 
should be recalled that during the 1950s, 
the Organization of Central American 
States (OCAS)made an attempt to bring 
economic integration activities under its 
control and co-ordination, but was 
unsuccessful. 
Within the sphere of strictly economic 
efforts, the programme is marked by a 
decentralized institutional set-up, resul-
ting precisely from the application of 
several different approaches in Central 
American integration, since, on the one 
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hand, separate institutions were esta-
blished to be responsible for some 
particular joint activity (like ESAPAC 
and ICAITI), whereas, on the other 
hand, emphasis on trade integration led 
to the emergence of the programme's 
own organs (the Economic and Executi-
ve Councils and the Permanent Secre-
tariat). To the foregoing may be added, 
inter alia, the specific institutions in the 
fields of monetary integration (the 
Central American Monetary Council) 
and of regional financing (the Central 
American Bank for Economic Inte-
gration). 
The decentralization described indu-
bitably involved certain advantages: for 
example, the full brunt of the effects of 
the 1969 conflict between two of the 
countries participating in the programme 
did not have to be borne by a single 
institution. While the Organization of 
Central American States (OCAS) was 
seriously weakened, the Central Ameri-
can Bank for Economic Integration 
(BCIE) and the Central American Mone-
tary Council continued to operate more 
or less normally. These advantages were 
not always turned to good account, 
however, because of the permanent 
tension created by the claims of some 
institutions to supremacy over others, 
(a) General considerations 
Undoubtedly, Central America 
would be in a better position to con-
and the action taken by all of them to 
preserve their relative autonomy. For 
example, it was never possible to subor-
dinate BCIE's financing programme to 
the overall development policies drawn 
up by SIECA and approved by the 
governments (policies which, moreover, 
were never systematically formulated), 
nor did the experience of the 1960s 
testify to much co-ordination between 
the activities of SIECA and those of the 
Executive Secretariat of the Central 
American Monetary Council. It is true 
that the tensions arising out of the desire 
to co-ordinate the work of all these insti-
tutions (centralization) and their autono-
mous action (decentralization) could 
have been somewhat eased by the 
establishment of a voluntary co-
ordination and consultation mechanism. 
But the sporadic inter-institutional meet-
ings held throughout the period under 
review seldom led to the identification 
of areas of common interest on which 
the regional institutions could present a 
united front vis-à-vis the criterion of the 
governments. Rather did they reveal the 
wasteful expenditure of energy in coping 
with the tensions in question, which 
only helped to weaken the relative 
influence that each individual regional 
institution could exercise over the 
governments. 
front the many obstacles to its develop-
ment if it were a larger economic unit 
instead of five separate economic 
entities. The obvious advantages which 
make its economic integration advisable 
3. 
Implications of past experience 
for the future 
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-economies of scale, more rational loca-
tion of investment, greater specialization 
at the regional level, more efficient utili-
zation of the area's resources, improve-
ment in its bargaining power vis-à-vis 
third countries- are well-known, and 
require no further analysis. It is there-
fore perfectly justifiable, prima facie, to 
promote ever-increasing economic inter-
dependence between the five economies 
of the region, as the best way of accele-
rating development in each country. 
This does not mean, however, that a 
predetermined goal -such as that of 
establishing a customs union or forming 
a bigger economic unit- will necessarily 
have to be pursued, since, as indicated 
earlier, past experience in Central Ameri-
ca and in other integration movements 
shows that the construction of legal 
instruments which are too closely geared 
to achieving such objectives, instead of 
ensuring their attainment, is conducive 
to their violation; and the 'incremen-
talisf or linear view associated with this 
approach impedes the incorporation in 
integration activities of new fields not 
envisaged in the original commitments. 
The experience gained in the opera-
tion of the Central American Common 
Market in the 1960s can teach other 
important lessons of which advantage 
ought to be taken in mapping out the 
future progress of the movement. It 
would be advisable, for example, to 
continue to promote integration -as was 
done in the past— by means of several 
simultaneous approaches, although a 
shift of emphasis in respect of the predo-
minant integration style would seem to 
be justified, at least until significant 
changes occur in the degree of political 
will shown by the governments to allo-
cate greater powers to the regional 
institutions. 
It would also be as well to avoid 
some of the problems that arose in the 
1960s as a result of the excessive empha-
sis placed on market integration, because 
that made it difficult to smooth out the 
inequalities in the distribution of the 
costs and benefits deriving from the 
process. This does not, of course, imply 
failure to recognize the considerable 
headway made so far in the establish-
ment of the Common Market. One of 
the key tactics on which Central Ameri-
can integration would have to rely in the 
next few years is precisely the preserva-
tion — and as far as possible the 
improvement— of what has been 
achieved in the past in respect of the 
free-trade area and the common tariff. In 
other words, the market integration 
approach will be bound to continue 
playing an important role in the future. 
A second tactic could be the assign-
ment of greater importance to the 
project approach. Thus the future 
integration process would be guided by 
more pragmatic and realistic criteria, 
some of the obstacles that have hindered 
progress in the past fifteen years would 
be avoided, and integration would more 
usefully serve the fundamental end 
represented by the countries' economic 
and social development. 
Stronger emphasis on integration by 
projects affords considerable advantages. 
In the first place, it seems to offer great-
er possibilities of correcting disequi-
libria, particularly if the identification 
and preparation of joint projects or 
activities are supplemented by increased 
support from the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration. Secondly, it 
eliminates objectives that are Utopian or 
unattainable within specified deadlines, 
failure to meet which, owing to political 
factors, merely helps to weaken the 
process. Thirdly, it is the most flexible 
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system for the incorporation of new acti-
vities more outstandingly important for 
integration, thus permitting the interests 
of the five countries to be more effecti-
vely unified in specific joint activities. 
Moreover, if in view of the develop-
ment of the process —and as a result of 
the progress achieved by placing greater 
emphasis on integration by projects- the 
governments showed that they were poli-
tically prepared to take integration a 
step further by gradually delegating 
powers to the regional institutions, it 
would be possible to continue advancing 
through the adoption of a third tactic: 
the integrated development approach. 
It must be stressed here that the pro-
cess in mind would not be devoid of a 
conceptual framework and based exclusi-
vely on pragmatic or ' immediatist ' 
action which might or might not ultima-
tely serve the purpose of increasing the 
degree of interdependence among the 
countries. The aim, in the last issue, 
should be to promote such interdepen-
dence by all the means in the power of 
the governments and the regional 
institutions, always with the idea of co-
operating in the development of each 
individual country and, therefore, of the 
region as a whole. 
In short, the intention would be deli-
berately to expand the scope of the 
Central American integration process by 
incorporating new activities which the 
governments would undertake jointly, 
without neglecting follow-up of the 
progress already achieved. With such an 
approach, the emphasis would fall more 
on integration activities and less on the 
fulfilment of formal commitments. 
The main criterion ruling the adop-
tion of new projects or joint activities 
would be simply the possibility of gene-
rating benefits for the various countries. 
The application of this criterion and the 
increasing interdependence and commu-
nity of interests among the countries 
that would gradually emerge would 
indicate the lines along which integration 
should develop in the future and would 
help to overcome any opposition there 
might be to the adoption of more ambi-
tious measures. 
All this would mean deferring objec-
tives of a global type, such as, for 
example, the formation of a customs 
union within a specific period, or the 
perfecting of an economic union. It 
would be sufficient to adopt as a general 
integration objective that of furthering 
the development of the five countries of 
the region, and as an instrumental objec-
tive that of reaching higher levels of 
interdependence, without stipulating 
stages on the way. 
Moreover, it would seem preferable 
to abandon the 'incrementalist' or 
linear view -that one stage inexorably 
follows another- in favour of a 'se-
quence' whereby the increasing degrees 
of interdependence sought would be 
attained not in predetermined succession 
but only when the actual dynamics of 
the process so dictated and prevailing 
circumstances permitted. 
Consequently, any excessively global-
ist pretensions, in the sense of endea-
vouring to deal simultaneously at the 
national level and within the context of 
integration with all activities related to 
economic and social development, would 
have to be renounced. 
Lastly, it would be necessary to 
design an institutional framework that 
would be applicable to a multiple 
system, with special emphasis on integra-
tion by projects. Some of these proposi-
tions are explained in greater detail 
below. 
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(b) Requirements in some specific areas 
The adoption of an integration 
system in Central America which would 
give more importance to integration by 
projects within the range of approaches 
suggested -again it must be urged, 
without completely abandoning the 
application of the other approaches-
would influence the method of organi-
zing the effort to achieve increasing 
degrees of interdependence. First, it 
would be necessary to specify criteria for 
selecting new activities to be subjected 
to common treatment; secondly, the 
institutional framework -a t the national 
and regional level- would have to be 
shaped on the lines required by the pro-
ject system. While no attempt will be 
made to deal with the subject exhausti-
vely, some considerations on these 
aspects of the problem are presented 
below. 
(i) Criteria for the selection of prio-
rity areas. As pointed out earlier, integra-
tion projects should bring intrinsic 
benefits to the member countries and 
also generate advantages which are 
beyond their reach when they are opera-
ting unilaterally. These benefits may 
derive from (a) projects or joint activities 
implying economies of scale; (b) projects 
entailing indirect benefits or external 
economies; and (c) projects which help 
to reduce the vulnerability of the partici-
pating economies. A combination of 
these possibilities may, of course, occur. 
Projects implying economies of scale 
are the most obvious and the most com-
monly invoked justification for integra-
tion, particularly in small markets like 
those of the individual Central American 
countries. This advantage is most fre-
quently exemplified, of course, in the 
manufacturing sector, and as technologi-
cal innovations are introduced the 
economies of scale increase. For instan-
ce, the operation of a specific plant on 
reasonably efficient lines may require 
the expanded market of several countries 
under an integration programme. In 
other cases, it will be simply a matter of 
taking advantage of that market to 
install a few plants operating at optimum 
capacity instead of a larger number 
operating below the optimum level. The 
establishment of plants that will operate 
at their maximum capacity is also impor-
tant if competing on the world market is 
an end in view, a point which is likewise 
of interest to the Central American 
countries. 
The possibility of profiting by 
economies of scale is not, however, limi-
ted to the manufacturing sector. 
Although it may not seem a very impor-
tant factor in agricultural production, 
there may be advantages in operating 
jointly in the fields of processing and 
marketing. In the case of Central Ameri-
ca, for example, joint action -by either 
the public sector or private entrepre-
neurs- might be considered in connexion 
with the sale of fruit and vegetables 
from the whole region to third countries. 
Another sector in which concerted 
action permits a saving in costs is that of 
physical infrastructure, as regards not 
only the joint designing of projects in 
the transport, communications, energy 
or water resources sectors, but also their 
joint operation or management Similar-
ly, there are evident advantages in 
dealing jointly with research and some 
aspects of education, a fact which was 
recognized in the first half of the 1950s 
with the establishment of the Nutrition 
Institute for Central America and 
Panama (INCAP), the Central American 
Research Institute for Industry (ICAITI) 
and the Advanced School of Public 
Administration (ESAPAC) (now the 
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Central American Institute of Public 
Administration (ICAP) ). 
Lastly, the services sector offers 
distinct possibilities for taking advantage 
v of economies of scale, as has been shown 
in the East African Community, where a 
regional port unit, airline and railway 
line have been set up, as well as a single 
postal service. In Central America, 
examples of this type of joint action can 
also be found in the radio aids to aircraft 
provided by the Central American Air 
Traffic Corporation (COCESNA) and in 
the joint efforts to promote tourism 
through the Secretariat for Central Ame-
rican Tourism Integration (SITCA). 
The indirect benefits or external 
economies which might be obtained 
from joint projects or activities are close-
ly related to the benefits deriving from 
economies of scale, but they may have a 
value of their own. For example, entre-
preneurial capacity in Central America 
could be improved by means of regional 
projects. A secondary benefit stemming 
from the execution of a regional project 
may be the encouragement of a higher 
level of competition, which would 
redound to the advantage of the consu-
mer and would help to increase effi-
ciency. 
T he third criterion mentioned 
-reduction of the vulnerability of the 
economies- is based on the fact that in 
many cases governments can more effec-
tively counteract factors which are 
adverse to their economic development 
by taking joint instead of unilateral 
action. The external sector probably 
offers the best chances in this respect, 
both because a region has stronger 
bargaining power vis-à-vis third coun-
tries, and because it affords greater room 
for manoeuvre in influencing the beha-
viour of exports, imports or movements 
of capital.49 In other words, the reduc-
tion of the external vulnerability of the 
Central American economies is another 
of the main justifications for underta-
king joint projects or activities.50 
Not only can adverse factors of 
external origin be dealt with in common, 
however, but also some of internal 
origin. The identification and execution 
of activities within the framework of 
integration, for example, may permit a 
greater degree of intervention in some 
that are awkward or over-risky to tackle 
at the internal level, as might be the case 
with regard to action in the tax field or a 
regional policy vis-à-vis direct foreign 
investment. At the same time, regional 
activity can reinforce action taken by 
each government at the internal level; 
there is no doubt, for example, that the 
work of the Joint Programming Mission 
referred to in the previous chapter 
strengthened the planning process at the 
level of the individual countries. 
In brief, integration offers a platform 
for action which at the national level 
may not be regarded as necessary, but 
which would favourably influence the 
development of the individual countries, 
and, moreover, would give the group of 
countries as a whole additional economic 
49
 This factor was undoubtedly taken into 
consideration when it was decided to establish 
the Latin American Economic System (SELA), 
constituted under an agreement signed in 
Panama on 17 October 1975. However, the 
possibility of deciding on specific activities in 
the field of foreign trade, for example, is greater 
among a group of countries as homogeneous 
as those of Central America than among so 
heterogeneous a group as the members of 
SELA. 
50
 See Sugerencias para reactivar a corto 
plazo la integración económica centroameri-
cana, op.cit., especially pp. 61-93. 
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strength to overcome the obstacles 
hindering its development. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the 
idea of reducing the vulnerability of the 
Central American economies on the basis 
of joint activities is not confined to the 
public sector alone. Entrepreneurs too 
have discovered the advantages of joining 
forces at the regional level - a case in 
point is the Central American Fede-
ration of Manufacturers' Associations 
(FECAICA)- in order to give more 
weight and specificity to the demands 
they put before their governments. 
(ü) How to deal with distribution 
problems. The fact that a joint project or 
activity may bring benefits, either 
because it implies economies of scale and 
indirect economies or because it helps to 
make the economies of the region less 
vulnerable, does not mean that such 
benefits are distributed equally among 
all the countries. What is more, in such 
cases as, for example, the establishment 
of a single industry to supply regional 
demand, the benefits may be concen-
trated in the country where the plant is 
located and, in line with the reasoning of 
neo-classical economic theory,51 may 
even be converted into costs for the rest 
of the countries. 
Hence the importance of distin-
guishing between activities which involve 
sacrifices of some kind for the partici-
pants and those which represent no cost 
to any of them, or whose cost can be 
transferred to third countries. For 
example, the establishment of a Central 
American company for marketing vege-
tables abroad may in all probability 
entail no sacrifice for any of the coun-
tries in comparison with what is likely to 
happen when each performs this task 
unilaterally. This type of project would 
51
 See The Customs Union Issue, op. cit. 
be the most acceptable from the stand-
point of the distribution of benefits. 
Others, in contrast, do raise the problem 
of costs for some and benefits for others. 
For example, the establishment of an 
industry in one of the countries may 
yield profits which are seen as losses by 
the rest. To even matters up, it is advisa-
ble to prepare groups of projects in 
sufficient number to ensure that the 
sacrifices which one country may have 
to put up with in some activities will be 
offset by the benefits obtained in others, 
without of course carrying this to such 
an extreme as a mathematical distribu-
tion of costs and benefits among the five 
countries of the region. 
Furthermore, in analysing new pro-
jects the distribution criterion should 
always be kept in mind. Thus, preference 
could be given to projects whose opti-
mum location from the economic 
standpoint favoured the relatively less 
developed countries of the region. 
Another way of mitigating distribu-
tion problems when projects involved 
financial costs would be to obtain 
external support (for example, through 
international technical co-operation), in 
particular in order to reduce the burden 
for the relatively less developed coun-
tries, and thus make the projects viable. 
Lastly, it should be noted that it is 
the responsibility of the promotion 
instruments at Central America's dispo-
sal, especially the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration, to assign 
projects to specific countries on the basis 
of both optimum location and distribu-
tion criteria.52 
(iii) The role of programming, 
National planning has always been linked 
52
 See Planteamientos y posibles medidas 
en torno al problema del desarrollo equilibrado 
en Centroamérica, op. cit., pp. 31-33. 
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with integration, within what is descri-
bed here as the 'integrated develop-
ment' approach. The role of planning in 
Central America's future integration 
process would be no less important, even 
if preference were shown for the 
integration-by-projects style. 
In that event, it would not be abso-
lutely necessary to contemplate the overall 
or even the sectoral programming of the 
economic activity of the individual parti-
cipating countries in a regional context; 
what could be considered would be the 
programming of limited objectives. The 
idea is that planning offices in Central 
America should participate fully in the 
process of identifying projects and in the 
specific activities that would be the 
object of joint action, in line with the 
above criteria. At the same time, the 
planning offices would perform the 
essential task of gradually incorporating 
in their respective national plans the 
regional projects assigned to the 
individual countries, under whatever 
consensual agreements might be conclu-
ded. Lastly, once certain regional 
projects were included in a specific 
national plan, the planning office of the 
country concerned would supervise their 
timely execution. This task of supervi-
sion would be complementary to the 
promotion activities carried out by the 
Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration and the respective national 
development institution. 
. Decisions regarding the allocation of 
projects and their incorporation in natio-
nal development plans require the 
convening, at fairly regular periods, of 
meetings of government officials holding 
different ranks in national planning offi-
ces —including the Directors them-
selves- so that they can become directly 
acquainted with the process of identi-
fying and preparing projects of regional 
interest. These questions are examined in 
greater detail below. 
(iv) The institutional framework. An 
integration approach such as that under 
review, in which greater emphasis is 
placed on integration by projects than in 
the past, points to institutional decentra-
lization. In fact, in line with the principle 
that institutional solutions must respond 
to the objectives pursued in each joint 
activity, there might emerge, as an 
extreme case, an institutional formula for 
each joint project or action, depending on 
the objectives pursued. It is impossible in 
the present phase of Central American 
integration, to visualize a formula that 
would be universally valid for all activities 
undertaken in common. 
It might be argued that this implies 
some contradictions and a certain 
amount of overlapping of functions and 
inefficient use of resources, but that 
happens even in each country's own 
public administration, and the disadvan-
tages would be amply offset by the 
advantages of institutional decentrali-
zation in a process which has not yet 
compassed the formation of a major unit 
possessing regional organs with supra-
national features. One of these advantages 
is that some sectors would make more 
progress than others and, in times of 
crisis, the adverse effects would be 
spread over several institutions instead of 
being concentrated in a single one. 
This is by no means intended to 
suggest that there should be no co-
ordination between regional institutions. 
It only recalls the lack, within the inte-
gration programme, of a central entity 
with sufficient authority and nower to 
enforce the implementation of decisions 
both by governments and by the other 
regional institutions. 
Nor would a system such as that des-
cribed necessarily exclude a community 
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organ; rather it influences the type of 
powers that would or would not be assig-
ned to the organ in question. This subject 
will be reverted to later. 
Thus, on the basis of the objectives 
pursued in each project or joint activity, 
distinctions may be established between 
the institutional frameworks required for 
each type of activity. First, there would 
be those activities in which the partici-
pating governments possess a certain 
amount of experience but the benefits of 
which are obtained unilaterally. If the 
execution of joint activities in these 
fields would not immediately bring 
greater benefits to all concerned - a 
matter that would have to be determined 
case by case— the action taken could be 
reduced to mere exchanges of informa-
tion and experience with a view to the 
identification of areas of common 
interest. Such exchanges could take 
place at intergovernmental meetings of 
experts which would precede the adop-
tion and execution of any common 
project. That is what happened in 
Central America, for example, during the 
1950s, with the various sub-committee s 
of the Economic Co-operation Commit-
tee, some of which still meet periodi-
cally. 
This fairly simple type of insti-
tutional arrangement requires at least the 
existence of a secretariat that will 
assume responsibility for the compila-
tion of data, procedural matters (such as 
the convening of meetings, agendas and 
records), and the identification of the 
first joint projects, while the participants 
are amassing the necessary reciprocal 
knowledge. After identifying a common 
project, these intergovernmental expert 
committees would submit it for approval 
by a higher authority -preferably with 
ministerial status- and the secretariat 
serving at the expert level could also 
serve as such at the ministerial level. 
Secondly, in the case of a project 
involving a specific activity the benefits 
of which would be accessible to all 
participants, the institutional formula 
would also be relatively simple. The 
financing of the project —either by equal 
or by unequal contributions, according 
to whether the distribution problem is or 
is not to be taken into account— would 
represent a body of resources whose 
management would be entrusted to a 
group of regional specialists under the 
d irection of an intergovernmental 
committee which would adopt its deci-
sions unanimously. This has generally 
been the formula used in the regional 
research institutes of Central America, 
with satisfactory results. Experience 
would seem to advise its adoption, as far 
as possible, through the conclusion of an 
international treaty that would endow 
the group executing the project with the 
necessary legal status. 
Thirdly, for the provision of a regio-
nal public service a more complex 
institutional formula would be required. 
As in the case of the radio-aids for air-
craft provided in Central America by 
COCESNA, a regional corporation could 
be set up, to be financed by its members, 
whose representatives would form its 
supreme organ. The distribution of 
profits, if any, would be proportional to 
the contributions, and here again the 
alternative course of unequal distribu-
tion of contributions and profits might 
be considered, still with a view to bal-
anced growth. The establishment of such a 
corporation would also have to be based 
on the conclusion of an international 
treaty giving the executing authorities 
the legal status necessary for the provi-
sion of the service. 
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As noted earlier, in none of the alter-
natives hitherto described should the 
possibility be overlooked of obtaining 
ex ternal financing to supplement the 
financing contributed by the partici-
pants. In all the cases mentioned, it 
would help in some degree to reduce the 
cost that the execution of the project 
might involve. 
Lastly, for projects connected with 
the production of a good or the provi-
sion of some service by private investors, 
or in the case of mixed investments, it 
would be advisable to prepare a regional 
statute to regulate the constitution of 
regional enterprises. Until such a statute 
were brought into force, enterprises 
would have to be established in accor-
dance with the laws of the member 
country where the project was located, 
and operate on the basis of free trade 
and the protection afforded them by the 
common tariff, or of the fiscal incentives 
they received from the host country. If 
such enterprises were to have exclusive 
access to the expanded market, it would 
be necessary to explore the desirability 
of adopting regional provisions to regu-
late their operation and prevent their 
monopolistic position from affecting 
consumers in the region. Such regu-
lations already exist in Central America 
for enterprises classified under the 
Régime for Integration Industries. 
Advantage could be taken of that expe-
rience in the case of similar enterprises. 
The decision to establish a specific indus-
try would be complemented by an 
intensive promotional campaign which 
could be entrusted to the Central Ameri-
can Bank. 
All the above considerations refer to 
any new projects or activities which the 
participants might decide to undertake 
jointly in view of the impossibility of 
obtaining identical benefits unilaterally, 
With this same purpose of obtaining 
greater benefits, some activities which 
the governments are already carrying out 
individually could be tackled on a regio-
nal scale. The institutional solution 
would then be more complex, since in so 
far as the aim was to make activities that 
already existed at the national level com-
patible at the regional level, some 
formula would have to be found for co-
ordinating policies, and this would 
involve, in addition to the actual work of 
co-ordination, the indication of certain 
regional priorities to which government 
action might have to be subordinated. In 
this case, the co-ordination of policies 
would have to be conceived along such 
lines as to bring the participants some 
tangible benefits in return. Here an 
example is set by the co-ordination acti-
vities which are made a requisite for 
obtaining financing, in the recent loans 
extended by the Central American 
Monetary Stabilization Fund (FOCEM) 
to three central banks in the region. 
Another important point in connex-
ion with the institutional aspect is that 
the groups or units directly or indirectly 
benefiting from each new joint activity, 
Le., those most interested in the execu-
tion of the project, should be identified 
as clearly as possible. This would apply 
not only to governments, but also to the 
interested private groups in the region. 
An essential requisite would be that 
neither the one nor the other should be 
visualized as a unitary body with a 
monolithic will. Such concepts as the 
"national interest" or the "interest of 
the private sector" have been shown, in 
practice, to be too abstract, because 
underlying them are the internal 
conflicts occurring within each govern-
ment or interest group with respect to 
the formulation of what is then interpre-
ted as the " national" or "entrepre-
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neurial" position. The aim behind this 
non-unitary conception of the agents of 
the process is to make use of the diverse 
influences wielded by their component 
elements in determining the resultant 
position reached. 
A further effect of intégrât ion is t 
measures which should be expressly 
pursued is to promote the greatest possi-
ble regional solidarity among govern-
ment officials or units, or homologous 
groups which have to deal with similar 
problems at the national level. The way 
the Central American Monetary Council 
has been operating may serve to exem-
plify this type of esprit de corps, which 
has been established between the central 
banks of Central America, at different 
levels of authority, and has brought out 
a regional solidarity based on a shared 
view of their position within the indivi-
dual governments. To this may be 
ascribed the positive results achieved in 
connexion with monetary integration. 
It would be equally interesting if 
each new integration activity served to 
increase the participants' operating 
capacity in sectors that were relegated to 
a secondary plane. A case in point, for 
example, is the TRANSMAR project, 
which has brought into focus the need 
for government units specializing in the 
design of port and maritime navigation 
policies. Of course, the establishment 
and strengthening of such units would 
later raise the more difficult problem of 
regional co-ordination for their opera-
tion, but that is no reason why their 
mere establishment should not be one of 
the positive effects of any integration 
activity. 
None of the foregoing comments 
refers to the institutional requirements 
involved in conserving the interdepen-
dence already attained - a s in the case of 
free trade and the common tariff in 
Central America— because the only 
possible way to preserve it would seem 
to be to continue unflaggingly increasing 
it by specifying and putting into practice 
new activities complementary to those 
already existing. The need to extend the 
coverage of the existing activities and 
include other new ones is considered an 
important part of this conception of 
integration, and in such an event the new 
complementary activities would have to 
be identified and carried out by the same 
institutions as were responsible for the 
original undertakings. 
The institutions referred to could 
continue to operate as multinational 
units without supranational powers 
-like SIECA-, but with some of the 
features of a community organ, as, for 
example, the power of initiating action. 
In both cases, their main responsibilities 
could be (1) systematically to identify 
new areas of interest with a view to 
deliberately producing spill-over; (2) to 
undertake follow-up and promotion 
activities in connexion with the execu-
tion of such projects; and (3) to co-
ordinate, on a consensual basis, the 
activities of the rest of the regional 
institutions. 
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Comments by Cristobal Lara Beau tell 
It was fortunate that the agents of inte-
gration in Central America never trou-
bled their heads about the style that had 
been adopted, or the characteristics of 
the integration model that was being 
created; whether the process was being 
conducted on 'incremental', global or 
partial lines; or, lastly, whether one or 
other of these characteristics corres-
ponded to one or other specific type of 
co-operation. Though it may seem an 
irony, no fixed rules governed integra-
tion in its formative phase in Central 
America, the approach changing in 
accordance with what were deemed to 
be the needs of the region. For it was 
not so much the type of integration 
pursued that was of concern as its reper-
cussions on the regional economy, and, 
specifically, the physiognomy that 
would supersede the old patterns 
displaced by new developments. 
Today we are suffering from an itch 
for classification so acute that at times 
activities are felt to be of interest less for 
their results than for the broader type of 
action within which they are comprised: 
in other words, for their classification. 
And this almost inevitably determines a 
leaning towards isolated and sometimes 
small-scale activities, which are proposed 
and advocated precisely because of their 
isolation, because they are viable, 
because supposedly they can be carried 
out at no cost to anyone or benefit all 
alike, or in the light of any other crite-
rion relevant to the status and characte-
ristics of the recommended groups of 
decisions. Not very many years ago, in 
Latin America, there were some who 
went so far as expressly to defend what 
was then called micro-integration, that 
is, the promotion of common activities 
on a small scale. 
As such activities, however sporadic 
or modest, need something behind them 
greater than themselves to give them 
impetus, and that 'something' not only 
has lost strength in recent years, but is 
sometimes considered unnecessary and 
even counterproductive, the path they 
offer may lead to a veritable cul-de-sac: 
to utopias in reverse, which are as unat-
tainable as utopias themselves, but, unlike 
these, even if they were attained would 
bring about no fundamental change. 
Herein lies initial food for thought. 
Whatever the extent to which the advance 
towards any action of far-reaching 
scope has been interrupted or seriously 
hindered, it is still true that neither 
Central America nor, where the case 
arises, any other Latin American region 
will achieve its integration through isola-
ted activities, related to narrow horizons. 
Whether we like it or not, a minimum 
push must be given without which 
continued progress will lack impetus or 
will not be possible at all. In other 
words, specific activities, however speci-
fic they may be, will thrive in the 
propitious environment of broader 
impulses and programmes from which 
they will stem. 
This is a point worth dwelling on, 
because it is fashionable to believe that 
much of what happens outside integra-
tion programmes (agreements between 
private enterprises, joint investment 
projects and the ways in which the trans-
national corporations specialize for the 
market) occurs independently not only 
of the programmes but of integration 
itself. And given this belief, it is only one 
step farther to the replacement of inte-
gration programmes -complex, entailing 
commitments and presumably of 
indefinite duration— by specific projects 
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of limited and clearly-defined scope and 
effects. 
Experience in Central America, and 
in other Latin American regional 
groupings, does not bear out such a view; 
non-formal or parallel integration comes 
into being, in the natural course of 
things, in an environment already ren-
dered favourable for its emergence by the 
fact that integration programmes them-
selves and policy commitments have held 
out prospects of profitability and the 
certainty of permanence. 
Consequently, such central integra-
tion impulses are an indispensable 
requisite if all the rest is to follow. Or, to 
put it better, instruments and policies 
will sometimes need changing because 
they are worn out by too much use, 
because they have entered upon a phase 
of manifestly diminishing returns, or, 
because, on the contrary, after years of 
lying idle they have grown rusty, as may 
also happen, and indeed has happened 
with some of the integration policies 
subscribed to in their time. But what will 
not be possible is to dispense with the 
central impulse and yet continue advan-
cing in respect of a balanced and 
favourable relationship among our 
economies: that is, towards lasting 
solidarity. 
Of course, another requisite is plura-
lity of approach, and programmes and 
projects such as those rightly proposed 
in Central America's case by the authors 
of the article under review; but even 
more is it needful to find the bases for a 
new 'big push' whereby the stages 
already travelled can be left behind and 
new motive forces can be generated. 
That is the major problem; and it is at 
this point that Central America has 
stood since the earlier integration impul-
ses began to lose force. 
These impulses consisted mainly in: 
(a) the sudden expansion of the five 
countries' markets for any individual 
producer; and (b) regional import substi-
tution, a road already taken by other 
Latin American countries. These two 
movements, furthermore, were inward-
directed. 
The first of them came about at a 
specific moment, in 1960, but by its 
very nature this sudden expansion could 
only occur once and for all. The 
secondary effects of the historic change 
which consolidated the five national 
markets in a single whole are still opera-
tive today, but the change itself cannot 
be repeated. As regards the second 
factor, the possibilities inherent in 
regional import substitution and the 
birth and expansion of manufacturing 
industry are far from having spent them-
selves, and a valuable joint development 
potential still exists: but, for one reason 
or another, its exploitation has been 
deferred again and again. 
In these conditions, Central America 
cannot bemuse itself in contemplation of 
its own inward-directed co-operation, 
and there would be obvious advantages 
in carrying this co-operation on to the 
level of exports of manufactures to the 
rest of Latin America and to other areas: 
firstly, in view of the well-known fact 
that many industries are still affected by 
limitations of size, even taking due 
account of the Central American 
Common Market as a whole; and 
secondly, in order to bring about a signi-
ficant change of attitude, since for too 
many years economic co-operation in 
Central America has been centred on 
patching up disagreements. A supremely 
important change would be heralded by 
any effort on the part of the Central 
American countries to extend the 
frontiers of their reciprocal co-operation 
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and join together in exporting to third 
countries, since such a policy would tend 
to unite them, and the movement would 
thus gain fresh impetus. 
This would give rise to investment 
projects and programmes like those 
suggested by Cohen and Rosenthal, 
linked to the Central American Market 
and to that of other Latin American 
countries. The article by these two 
writers represents a valuable quest for 
solutions. It is an invitation to take 
another stride forward, and, for a while, 
to construct integration through projects 
of decisive significance for the economy: 
important enough, in fact, to lead in the 
course of time to the application of 
more general development and market 
expansion measures. This constitutes the 
'multiple approach' which the authors 
also recommend. But the essential 
element in the approach consists in 
projects which by virtue of their impor-
tance and the diversity of the fields they 
cover form a sort of new programme of 
integration activities. The key point to 
settle is whether the region is in a posi-
tion to mobilize the energies required for 
bringing such activities into being, 
without introducing major modifications 
in the political conditions surrounding 
integration. 
It would appear from all that has 
been said that in order to enter upon this 
phase of achievement certain basic 
changes are needed. On the one hand, it 
would be necessary to pass from a phase 
of negotiation among the five countries 
to a phase of negotiation vis-à-vis others, 
and of co-operation with other countries 
too. Despite the setbacks suffered by 
integration in recent years, Central 
America is in no danger of losing its 
identity, but it could reaffirm that 
identity now in contact with others 
instead of merely within its own relative 
isolation. This need to forge links and 
enlarge the scale of economic operations 
is not peculiar to the small Central 
American area, and holds good in 
varying degrees for the rest of Latin 
America. 
But what would be the conditions in 
which relations could be established with 
other countries and regions in Latin 
America? It can be said straight away 
that they would have to be different 
from those prevailing in the past. Central 
America could not compete as a minor 
unit among major units unless it were 
able to count upon its own complete 
internal cohesion. The last five years 
have witnessed a rapid expansion of 
trade with the other Latin American 
countries, but on the basis of a relation-
ship which is still ill-balanced, since 
imports do not find their necessary 
counterpart in the shape of exports. 
Moreover, there are manifiest 
symptoms that the Central American 
programme has lacked certain indispen-
sable elements that would enable it to 
help in finding ways out of urgent nation-
al problems, to cope with particular 
combinations of circumstances, or to 
adapt itself to the rapid economic 
changes that have taken place in the last 
few years; not to speak of that veritable 
Achilles', heel of integration, inequality 
of benefits, which means that some 
profit by the movement and others gain 
little or nothing at all. Problems of this 
type are outside the scope of the so-
called project approach, and until their 
solution is ensured they will make it 
difficult for suitable projects to be 
formulated. 
Another requisite for progress seems 
to be closer linkage between integration 
efforts and some of the most crucial 
problems of national development, to 
further which is the function of such 
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efforts in a region like Central America, 
as was clearly envisaged from the very 
outset. And as long as they remain 
apparently remote from such problems 
as unemployment or income levels, they 
will meet with a cool reception, and will 
not kindle the same warm interest as 
national development policies. When the 
linkage in question is achieved, integra-
tion will no longer be a 'week-end 
exercise', as a well-known Central 
American once said, but will tend to 
enlist steady and continuing attention 
and support. To recover from the inte-
gration crisis, in a lasting sense of the 
words, is to enter upon active partici-
pation in the development problems of 
the countries and of the region. Here too 
the project approach needs the support 
of the more permanent integration 
instruments and policies. 
The time may possibly come when 
projects and programmes of broad signi-
ficance can be launched, and when this 
will be the best way of making progress 
in integration; but not in the midst of a 
climate of opinion which undervalues or 
disregards the integration movement, for 
if there is no faith in the strength of the 
integrated market, there will hardly be 
faith in the economic destiny of the 
activities established within it, nor will 
the future hold out motivating pros-
pects. Julio Melnik, one of the best 
thinkers on the project problem —and on 
many others—, when bombarded with 
questions as to what could be done to 
encourage the emergence of projects, 
used to say with irrefutable logic that 
the sine qua non was a climate of deve-
lopment; without development no 
project could exist. And we might say 
that neither can projects be looked for 
without a climate of integration. 
Again, the Central American econo-
mies viewed their early integration 
efforts in a far-reaching perspective 
which clearly revealed the prospect of a 
stronger, more advanced region, where 
the quality of life would be better. Such 
farsightedness is still needed. This it was 
that made it possible to deal with major 
and minor problems which otherwise 
would have impoverished the environ-
ment and retarded the pace. One of the 
factors which influenced the 1969 crisis 
and the discouragement preceding it —a 
factor which entered into every sphere 
of integration- was the gradual blurring 
of the great objective of unity combined 
with development. When it was lost sight 
of altogether, something very serious had 
happened: either reality could no longer 
provide sustenance for a constructive 
vision of the future, because the actual 
situation had deteriorated; or the 
programme had been flooded by the so-
called practical spirit, with the result 
that negotiation, haggling and the 
commercial instinct thrust aside all 
forward-looking aspirations, replacing 
them by the 'hard facts'. These facts 
proved too bitter to be stomached when 
they were impossible to reconcile or 
compare with the constructive view 
of integrated development that had 
hitherto constituted the horizon of the 
programme. 
Consequently, in the set of instru-
ments and policies which seem likely to 
be applied in the future, a hiatus can be 
perceived which it is to be feared 
projects and programmes alone will be 
unable to fill: a hiatus created by a lack 
of purpose which holds back integration, 
in the sense of economies which give one 
another functional support in their 
development and which all strengthen 
their own roots by their union. For this 
reason, it may be difficult at present to 
advance towards integration through 
isolated activities, and progress in that 
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direction can now be better envisaged as 
the product of a new impulse which will 
bring in its wake programmes and 
projects -even projects on a minimum 
scale- together with major policies. 
The time is not ripe, therefore, for 
isolated project-based activities, because 
no fertile ground has been prepared for 
them, and because they would have no 
strength to transmit but would exhaust 
what they possessed in their own vital 
effort to survive. Indubitably, there is a 
considerable margin for action in the 
form of that 'quiet progress' to which 
Professor Hirschman refers, and which is 
a path that many Central American acti-
vities and forms of co-operation have 
followed. Moreover, the approach pro-
posed by Cohen and Rosenthal incorpo-
rates a valuable point of departure that 
might facilitate its implementation, 
inasmuch as the coverage of the areas of 
action is strikingly wide, comprising not 
only integration industries and other 
productive activities, but also important 
lines of regional policy. This has a 
dimension that might promote new and 
highly necessary forms of co-operation 
among the countries. But at the same 
time the twofold need already indicated 
still exists: the need for fuller economic 
support, which, either by way of extra-
regional exports or by any other means, 
will link up Central American activities 
and will be capable of giving integration 
a new overall impetus; and the need to 
reconstitute the indispensable climate of 
achievements and objectives. 
The more thought is given to this 
matter, and the closer the scrutiny direc-
ted upon what has happened since 1969 
and what is happening now, at the time 
of writing —in Central America and in 
the world economy—, the more patent 
becomes the necessity of action bearing 
on the very pith and marrow of econo-
mic integration itself, not upon separate 
fragments of it 
To put it very briefly, the integration 
process must be more effectively related 
to the central motive forces of the nation-
al economies, to their purchasing 
power, to the region's natural resources 
(which are turned to very little account 
within the area) and to an export poten-
tial with fresh possibilities not only as 
regards the kind of goods exported, but 
also in respect of their destination, 
which could include new buyer markets 
both within Latin America and outside 
it. And when this is done, when integra-
tion is identified with these forces, it will 
tend to acquire new dimensions and 
operate on different levels, with vigour 
enough to find a way out of the present 
impasse, while strengthening all that 
already exists, not setting it aside. 
This prospect of mobilization of 
action and policies throws into relief 
both the need and the basis for comple-
mentarity between the Central American 
Common Market and the Caribbean area, 
as well as the Andean Group and its 
member countries. What is suggested is 
not a general association, for all three 
systems are still in process of evolution, 
and have not yet taken their final shape. 
It would be unreasonable, in such cir-
cumstances, to attempt broad and 
complex linkage. But such a policy 
emphatically could be tried out in 
relation to important groups of products 
where the enlargement of the market 
could offer the incentive lacking today 
for the development of the correspon-
ding productive activities; and not only 
markets could be pooled, but also finan-
cial and capital resources, organizational 
know-how, technology, and any other 
factors in respect of which the various 
regions are mutually complementary. 
This must not be left to chance, 
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however, but must constitute a line of 
policy followed by the five member 
countries. For chance, up to now, has 
been niggardly in promoting movements 
of such far-reaching importance. 
It is an open question whether 
Central America would or would not be 
capable of undertaking this sort of natu-
ral prolongation of its own inward-
directed integration, but at least the 
attempt could profitably be made. The 
Central American Common Market 
would find in it a compelling motivation 
that it lacks today. For in so far as it 
extends its exports to third countries, it 
will at the same time be obliged to raise 
the pitch of its economies to more effi-
cient levels of industrial production. And 
this too would be another major objec-
tive which integration could bring within 
reach, just as in the past it wrought a 
notable change for the better in the 
production conditions prevailing when 
the process began. 
It is sweeping changes such as those 
described that could afford the bases for 
the new 'big push' referred to earlier, 
whereby the stages already completed 
could be left behind and new motive 
forces could be generated. To that end, 
whatever specific form the 'push' may 
take, both projects and policies are 
needed. For projects will not be either 
formulated or executed by themselves, 
without the broader-based support of 
integration policies. 
Moreover, in the Central American 
countries a high degree of reciprocal 
interest still attaches to the economic 
destiny of each individual one, since 
integration has advanced far enough to 
make them interdependent. But it is an 
unbalanced interdependence, at least as 
regards the country whose development 
is lagging farthest behind. In the failure 
to bear in mind or grasp this circums-
tance the explanation of the integration 
crisis lies, just as, in the future, under-
standing and observance of the principle 
involved will account for the reactivation 
of the process. 
On the road towards normalization 
of the Central American Common 
Market there would be no question of 
enabling the countries that have gained 
less than others, or nothing at all, to 
recoup the benefits they previously had 
to forgo; the idea would be to construct 
their own source of profit and expansion 
within the normal operation of the sys-
tem. Nor, by its very nature, will the 
balance sought result from occasional 
action, or sporadic compensatory measu-
res. A set of economic interrelationships 
needs to be established that will link up 
the countries in such a way as to create a 
situation of shared prosperity, in which 
an adequate proportion of the impulse 
received by the country or countries 
whose growth is most dynamic will be 
commuted into demand for goods from 
countries that have not yet attained the 
same degree of dynamism. 
For this purpose, the establishment 
of a network of interrelated industries 
manufacturing final production goods 
and intermediate goods in the various 
countries is a worth-while objective 
which could mobilize a great deal of 
energy in the Central American area, and 
create the right conditions either for 
sharing the prosperity generated by inte-
gration itself or for mitigating and 
offsetting whatever repercussions of 
recession and instability in the world 
economy may affect the region in the 
future. Needless to say, the economic 
transformation and the consequent pro-
gress of the more backward countries is 
conceivable, and possible to achieve, 
only over the long term; but unbalanced 
development is an immediate problem 
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which, unless it is tackled efficiently 
from the outset - a s could be done now 
in a new phase— will gain increasing 
sway over the integration process. 
The next few years may also witness 
an effort to assign integration a role 
more closely associated - a s would seem 
appropriate to the degree of maturity 
that the process has already attained-
with one of the principal development 
problems by which the countries are 
beset. The forces roused by integration 
could be channelled into the deliberate 
creation of new jobs, for which special 
financing could be used, both domestic 
and from other sources; and advantage 
could be taken of the regional market 
and the rapprochement with other 
regions and countries to support an 
employment-creating programme on a 
large enough scale to make itself definite-
ly felt as a product of the integration 
Issac Cohen Orantes and Gert Rosenthal 
have written a rich, thoughtful and con-
structive paper about the difficult process 
of economic integration in Central 
America. It seems to me that they might 
have used as an epigraph for their story 
the following paragraph by the Polish 
philosopher Leszek Kolakowski: 
"The simplest improvements insocial 
conditions require so huge an effort on 
the part of society that full awareness of 
this disproportion would be most discou-
raging and would thereby make any 
social progress impossible. The effort 
must be prodigally great if the result is 
to be at all visible. . . . It is not at all 
process on which it is based. Admittedly, 
the pace of the process has slackened. 
But it would be a mistake to conclude 
that consequently no action can be 
taken in the field of employment. For 
the loss of speed is also due to the 
detachment of integration from this and 
other problems and possibilities - a 
defect which must now be corrected. 
Such lines of action may or may not 
prove feasible, and it would be unwise to 
oversimplify all that they imply in terms 
of effort and performance capacity. Be 
this as it may, however, there is a perma-
nent and basic meaning of integration 
which calls for broad movements of the 
kind indicated if progress is to continue. 
And it is salutary, too, to recognize this 
fact, so that full advantage may be taken 
of the strength still displayed by the 
integration process, which, in the midst 
of an abnormal situation, is continuing 
to produce undeniably potent effects. 
peculiar then that this terrible dispropor-
tion must be quite weakly reflected in 
human consciousness if society is to 
generate the energy required to effect 
changes in social and human relations. 
For this purpose, one exaggerates the 
prospective results into a myth so as to 
make them take on dimensions which 
correspond a'bit more to the immediately 
felt effort . . . [The myth acts like] 
a Fata Morgana which makes beautiful 
lands arise before the eyes of the 
members of a caravan and thus increases 
their efforts to the point where, in spite 
of all their sufferings, they reach the 
next tiny waterhole. Had such tempting 
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mirages not appeared, the exhausted 
caravan would inevitably have perished 
in the sandstorm, bereft of hope."1 
As I have said elsewhere, the moral 
of this fine passage is twofold: in the 
first place, the effort of the caravan 
would never have been forthcoming had 
the required social energy not been gene-
rated by the mirage. Secondly, in spite 
of the comparatively meagre result, the 
effort was definitely worth while since it 
alone permitted survival. 
Both conclusions are highly applica-
ble to the Central American experience 
with economic integration. That expe-
rience would not have been set in 
motion had it not been for the Fata 
Morgana of full economic unification 
and of its obvious implications in the 
political realm. Secondly, even though 
movement stalled at a considerable 
distance from that goal, the result justi-
fied the effort expended - i n the Central 
American case it achieved nothing as 
dramatic as survival (as in the story of 
the caravan), but it can certainly be 
credited with having made an important 
contribution to the economic growth of 
the region over the past twenty-five 
years. 
When the Central American expe-
rience is interpreted with the help of the 
Kolakowsky metaphor, another inferen-
ce or 'lesson' can be drawn: there are 
special difficulties in visualizing in 
advance intermediate outcomes, be it the 
'tiny waterhole' or the present fragmen-
tary character of economic integration in 
Central America. The reason is that 
"man may simply be unable to conceive 
of the strictly limited, yet satisfactory, 
advances, replete with compromises and 
1
 Leszek Kolakowski, Der Mensch ohne Al-
ternative, Munich, R. Piper, 1961, pp. 127-128. 
(My translation from the German translation.) 
concessions to opposing forces, which 
are the very stuff of 'incremental poli-
tics' as welt as the frequent result of 
ambitious socio-economic development 
moves".2 In other words, the goals we 
set ourselves are often Utopian not so 
much for the purpose of galvanizing 
social energy, but because goals are part 
of the future and the future can only be 
visualized in very simple terms, without 
qualification and fine nuances. The pre-
sent state of Central American integra-
tion could never have been specified in 
advance as an objective. It is the 
complex and contradictory, yet useful 
outcome of an action that had a far 
more simple objective and, once again, 
this outcome could not have been achie-
ved had that objective not been set. 
Naturally, the distance between the 
actual outcome and the objective gives 
the impression of 'fracaso' or of 'crisis'. 
A correct understanding of the normal, 
to-be-expected relationship between 
objectives and outcomes of social action 
would thus make for less' fracasomania '. 
As Cohen Orantes and Rosenthal 
imply, the time may have come to accept 
the outcome instead of continuously 
lamenting it as a failure. That would 
make it possible to conceive of further 
practical moves on the basis of the pre-
sent situation. In this connexion the 
observations about the tendency of 
import substitution within the Common 
Market are of particular interest. I had 
long thought that one pattern of indus-
trial integration that would make sense 
in Central America would be for one 
country to set up a new factory (say, 
cement) that would export to the neigh-
bouring countries part of its production 
2
 A.O. Hirschman, Development Projects 
Observed, Washington, D.C., The Brookings 
Institution, 1967, p. 33. 
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during the early years while the domestic 
market was not yet large enough to 
absorb all of its output. Later on, it 
would be another country's turn to build 
the next cement mill which would also 
export for a limited number of years, 
and so on. This sort of practical project 
planning can make a useful contribution 
once the 'idealistic' phase has been 
exhausted; but it can do so only after 
one has made one's peace with that fact, 
at least for a while, pending the next big 
push. 
It is instructive at this point to com-
pare the Central American integration 
experience with recent policy-making in 
the United States. Not so long ago 
Anthony Downs attempted to analyse 
what he calls the 'issue-attention cycle' 
in American policy-making by distin-
guishing the following phases of a policy 
problem, such as environmental pollu-
tion: 
(1) The 'pre-problem stage' during 
which the problem exists all right, but 
not much public attention is paid to it; 
(2) Then comes "alarmed discovery 
and euphoric enthusiasm". The problem 
is considered a priori fully solvable "if 
only we devote sufficient effort to it"; 
(3) In the next phase, it is realized 
that solving the problem may be costly 
and goes against the immediate interests 
of large and influential groups of people; 
(4) As a result of this realization, 
there is then a gradual decline of intense 
public interest, which is helped by the 
providential appearance of another 
problem that will occupy the limelight; 
(5) Finally, there is the 'post-
problem stage1 which differs from the 
pre-problem stage in that a number of 
efforts and agencies that have been set 
up to 'solve' the problem in Phase Two 
continue to exist and may actually make 
some quiet progress. Moreover, once the 
problem has passed through the cycle, it 
will continue to receive a modicum of 
public attention.3 
This is obviously a rather ironic 
scheme; it reflects the author's irritation 
with the spasmodic policy-making style 
lately prevalent in the United States. In 
comparison with this North American 
style it appears that Central America has 
not done so badly with its common 
market experience! It fits the Downs 
pattern rather well, but improves upon it 
since a number of important advances 
were actually achieved in phases (2) and 
(3) when the problem was first analysed 
and acted upon. In the Downs sequence 
the only phase with some positive 
accomplishments is the last one when 
the 'problem' has reached the 'post-
problem stage'. At this point, quiet 
progress becomes possible because the 
institutional framework now exists for 
dealing pragmatically with the matter. 
This seems precisely the present situa-
tion in Central America. The paper by 
Cohen Orantes and Rosenthal is in itself 
a strong indication that the reasonable, 
incremental phase (5) is at hand, and it 
also contains the sort of practical pro-
posals characteristic of that phase. 
3
 Summarized from "Up and Down with 
Ecology - the 'Issue-Attention Cycle ' ", The 
Public Interest, N° 28 (Summer 1972), New 
York, National Affairs Inc., pp. 38-50. With 
respect to point (4), Downs turned out to be 
prophetic, as in 1973 the energy problem dis-
placed the environmental pollution problem 
from the headlines. 
